Tehran meeting offers ...
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Why did the Taliban not attend the Tehran meeting, and what political message does their absence convey?
In different periods—both under the Taliban and under non-Taliban governments—two main approaches toward Iran have existed: one rooted in Persian-speaking constituencies and another driven by Pashtunism. During the Taliban’s first period in power, there was no positive approach toward Iran. This shifted under Hamid Karzai’s presidency, when relations with Tehran were strong despite US pressure to distance Kabul from Iran. In Karzai’s first term, relatively capable administrators prioritized national interests and viewed closer ties with Tehran as more beneficial than alignment with other countries that offered little political regard.
Even governments that emerged from ostensibly democratic processes failed to maintain a consistent approach toward Iran. During Karzai’s second term, intensified US pressure weakened ties, a trend that deepened under Ashraf Ghani, whose administration engaged Iran through a rigid Pashtunist lens. This resulted in fragile and often abnormal relations in multiple dimensions. Pashtunism dominated governance, and relations with Persian-speaking communities were historically strained.
These internal divisions persist today. In the Taliban’s second period in power, attitudes toward Iran remain fragmented. Some factions, such as the Haqqani network, are deeply skeptical, while others in the Taliban believe pragmatic engagement with Iran can help secure their interests. Participation—or non-participation—in political dialogues reflects these internal divergences. At no point, under democratic governments or Taliban rule, has there been a fully unified view of Iran within Afghanistan’s power structures. Consequently, attendance and outcomes in such talks are directly shaped by these enduring inconsistencies.
Given the fragility of the ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the failure of the Doha and Istanbul talks, what capacity does the Tehran meeting have to reduce tensions? Can Iran act as a mediator?
Despite repeated efforts by Afghan actors to avoid closer alignment with Iran, a persistent perception remains that—given extensive cultural ties, shared borders, and deep social, economic, and political linkages—Iran, as a major regional power, is better positioned than others to help address Afghanistan’s challenges. Historically, whenever Afghanistan turned to Iran, Tehran proved capable of offering meaningful assistance.
What distinguishes the Tehran meeting is that, unlike similar gatherings elsewhere, it is not held under the shadow of imperial power. In venues such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan, US influence often sets the tone of negotiations. Tehran, by contrast, provides a platform free from such dominance. As a result, the meeting can function not only as a mediation channel between Afghanistan and Pakistan but also as a means of easing tensions between Iran and Afghanistan themselves.
For the Taliban to sustain their rule, they must analyze surrounding dynamics with depth and clarity. The movement has long been plagued by uncertainty, with a large portion of its outlook shaped by rigid traditional norms disconnected from today’s world. Unless this worldview evolves, the Taliban will struggle to recognize not only Iran’s potential but also the capacities of other neighboring countries. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that Iran can play an effective role in addressing Afghanistan’s problems as well as resolving its own disputes with Kabul.