China’s chances of ...
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First, the strategic intentions of the United States and Israel are centered on the systematic destruction of Iran’s missile and drone networks, the seizure of its nuclear materials, and applying sufficient pressure to bring about Iran’s collapse or surrender. Assessments indicate that these intentions have not changed. We are witnessing changes in their behavior and rhetoric, but their strategic intentions remain intact.
(It should be noted that changes in behavior and rhetoric can happen relatively easily, whereas changes in intentions are much more difficult, because it takes a considerable amount of time for an intention to take shape and eventually become a strategic objective.)
Second, the United States and the Israeli regime view Iran’s current situation as a “window of opportunity.” From their perspective, the Gaza war, Iran’s inability to maintain the balance of the Axis of Resistance, the 12-day war and the developments that followed have led to the successive breaking of red lines, creating what they see as a historic opportunity — or, in their own words, a window of opportunity — to alter the regional balance of power. Abandoning this window of opportunity is something they would never accept.
Third, historical patterns show that conflicts of this magnitude, both in terms of the geography involved and their consequences, are highly unlikely to end without a tangible outcome. A confrontation of this nature must produce a concrete result.
Given the absence of any signs that these three underlying assumptions among American policymakers are changing, I do not see much chance of China, or any other country, succeeding in intervening. This is also one of the reasons previous mediation efforts have failed. It is not that the mediators lack the necessary power, but rather that the underlying assumptions shaping the Americans’ approach to the war have not changed.
Nevertheless, taking all these factors into account, I believe that diplomatic engagement by all potential mediators should be actively pursued, because a surprise that could bring the war to an end might emerge from these interactions. The likelihood of such an outcome is very low, but if it does materialize, its impact will be far-reaching.
There is a fourth point, which may be more important than all the preceding ones. There are two ways to analyze the war waged by the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran:
1. From a narrow perspective, we can view this war simply as a confrontation between the United States and Iran over the nuclear issue.
2. From a broader strategic perspective, we can interpret this war as part of a grand game in which China is the ultimate target.
The United States backed down in the tariff war with China because Beijing held a stronger bargaining card in the form of rare earth minerals. However, in an energy war, if Washington manages to gain control of energy chokepoints, China will have no stronger card to play against the United States.
This is why American strategists believe that, following Venezuela and the establishment of control over energy resources in South America, Iran is the only remaining obstacle to using the energy card against China. If they manage to defeat Iran, the energy lifeline will fall into American hands, making the United States the undisputed dominant power in this domain. In such circumstances, China would be forced to concede the game to its rival in their strategic competition.
Now, if we look at the issue from this second perspective, why should the United States have any interest in allowing its rival to enter the final round of the war?
My assessment is that Chinese strategists and policymakers understand this perspective and are designing the various components of their engagement strategy accordingly.
How would you assess the current state of our foreign policy in terms of cooperation with China?
Another important point is that our foreign policy needs to be redesigned in terms of its model of engagement. I believe that this type of engagement, in which a representative of the Supreme National Security Council, the Foreign Ministry or another institution travels to China on a particular occasion and expects to secure major achievements through one or two visits within a short period, falls somewhat short of what should be the desired model of engagement for the Islamic Revolution.
If we were to give this approach a name, we could call it “hurry-up diplomacy.” It is a type of diplomacy that the Chinese simply do not understand.
The point is that we have not yet reached an agreement on the issues at hand, yet we already want to reap the benefits of our visit. Well, that is simply not how things work.
We will only succeed in our diplomacy, at least in our relations with China, when we devote a considerable amount of time to building networks and holding discussions on issues of mutual concern to the two countries.
Unless these discussions take place at a strategic level and are characterized by continuity and sustainability, the outcome we are seeking will not materialize. Sensitive issues require a great deal of time and investment. We have to put in the hard work before we can achieve the desired results.
Therefore, in our diplomacy with other countries, we need a paradigm shift from “hurry-up diplomacy” to “commitment-based diplomacy.”