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Given Saudi Arabia’s expanding defense cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey, how effective could these security arrangements be in managing tensions with the Yemeni forces? Could greater reliance on defense pacts and military arrangements help contain the crisis, or might it instead heighten security competition and further complicate the regional landscape?
Saudi Arabia’s expanding defense cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey should be viewed in the context of Riyadh’s efforts to diversify its security partners, strengthen its deterrence capabilities and reduce its vulnerability to regional threats. Such cooperation could prove effective in areas including intelligence sharing, military training, defense industry development, air defense capabilities and operational capacity. However, it is important to recognize that greater military strength does not necessarily translate into a greater ability to resolve crises.
In the case of Yemen, the issue is not simply one of military superiority. It involves a range of political, geographical, social and security factors that cannot be managed through defense arrangements alone. Even if Saudi Arabia’s military cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey strengthens its deterrence, the question remains whether this added capability could persuade the Yemeni forces to accept a political agreement or merely encourage them to bolster their capacity to resist and expand the scope of their operations.
From this perspective, exclusive reliance on defense pacts could have a dual effect. On the one hand, raising the costs of military action for the opposing side could help prevent certain clashes. On the other, the emergence of rival military coalitions and an expanding arms race could intensify the region’s security dilemma. Under such circumstances, each actor may view its own actions as defensive and necessary, while the other side interprets those same moves as a threat to its security. The result would be growing mistrust and less room for diplomatic maneuver.
More importantly, Saudi Arabia’s defense cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence of a clearly defined operational alliance against the Yemeni forces or Iran. The nature of this cooperation, the extent of mutual commitments and the parties’ willingness to become involved in an actual crisis are all decisive factors that must be assessed separately.
My overall assessment is that military deterrence can complement diplomacy, but it cannot replace it. Lasting security in West Asia will be possible only when regional countries move away from exclusive reliance on military alliances and toward arrangements in which one country’s security is not secured at the expense of another’s. For Saudi Arabia, Iran and other regional actors, combining proportionate deterrence with active diplomacy and inclusive dialogue would be less costly and more sustainable than entering a cycle of escalating military competition.
