Shared interests key ...
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One way to prevent such an outcome is for Iran and the United States to move toward reducing their differences, defining shared interests, and normalizing relations so that these factors can serve as safeguards for the agreement. Unfortunately, that did not happen with the JCPOA, and the absence of such foundations ultimately contributed to its demise.
Iran’s deputy foreign minister has said that if Israel violates its commitments, a mechanism outlined in the memorandum of understanding will be activated, though no details have been disclosed. What scenarios or models can be envisaged for such a mechanism? Could it be purely political and diplomatic, or might it also involve security and field-related dimensions?
Israel was not directly present in the Iran-US negotiations, although it was informed of certain aspects of the agreement. Based on reports published in Western and Israeli media, the entire text was not coordinated with Israel. Moreover, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other ministers were reportedly caught off guard by both the announcement of the agreement and certain provisions, including the inclusion of Lebanon.
Some ministers have criticized both the agreement and the US administration, explicitly declaring that they do not consider themselves bound by its provisions. Israeli officials continue to insist on maintaining freedom of action in Lebanon.
This raises a highly important question: how can the United States prevent Israeli attacks in Lebanon? Will it rely solely on personal pressure and threats from President Trump toward Netanyahu, as has been witnessed on multiple occasions, including during discussions over a Gaza ceasefire? Or will Washington step up its pressure, potentially extending it to public threats as well?
Given the complexity of US-Israeli relations, it is difficult to predict the mechanism. It is certainly political in nature, but its exact form is not easily foreseeable. It could involve a US commitment to compel Israel to withdraw under specific conditions, including Hezbollah's commitment to maintaining a ceasefire.
Nevertheless, the Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon and continued Israeli attacks there appear to remain among the issues most likely to threaten the agreement.
What information is available regarding the financing mechanism, governance structure, and allocation of resources for the reported $300 billion investment fund to be established with the participation of Arab countries in the region? What objectives is the fund expected to pursue, and what benefits would it offer participating parties?
Almost none has been published. What is known so far is that the United States is not expected to contribute financially to the fund. Persian Gulf Arab countries will most likely provide the bulk of its resources. It is also reasonable to assume that a portion of Iran’s frozen or blocked assets abroad could be allocated to the fund.
The fund appears to be designed as an alternative to discussions surrounding war reparations and Iran’s post-war reconstruction, thereby addressing Iranian concerns through a different framework.
Persian Gulf Arab states are also likely to welcome the initiative, as they have been seeking stronger economic ties with Iran and the creation of shared economic interests with Tehran in order to establish broader areas of cooperation.
Iranian officials, for their part, would hope that the fund not only attracts substantial investment but also enables Persian Gulf Arab countries to use their influence in Washington to help facilitate the lifting of US sanctions on Iran. Without sanctions relief, the fund would have little practical ability to operate.
In this sense, the fund and its proposed $300 billion capital base could serve as a form of guarantee for sanctions relief. Should sanctions be reimposed or intensified, the Arab countries financing the fund would also suffer losses, or their investments could effectively be held hostage alongside Iran's restricted assets.