Ifs & buts of ...
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Accordingly, some in the United States argue that, in the post–October 7 landscape, weakening the Axis of Resistance—led by the Islamic Republic of Iran—is a prerequisite for establishing any new regional order. President Donald Trump, echoing this belief, has pursued a strategy of “coercive diplomacy” toward Tehran—an approach that helps explain recent strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Yet history offers a cautionary tale. Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, American neoconservatives made a similar argument: that removing Saddam Hussein would usher in stability and peace across the region. Reality proved otherwise. The war and its aftermath gave rise to extremist groups like ISIS, and led to failed states in Iraq and Syria. The ensuing chaos forced the US to scale back its military presence, with President Barack Obama ultimately fulfilling his 2008 campaign promise to withdraw American troops from Iraq.
For that reason, skepticism about the consequences of weakening Iran is well-founded. Diminishing Tehran’s influence could, paradoxically, fuel greater instability, much as it did in Iraq after 2003. In fact, the region’s dynamics make it impossible for an external power like the United States to impose order based on its own terms.
Perhaps recognizing this, the Trump administration over the past year has sought to pay more attention to the views of Arab states, especially members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. The signing of a defense pact with Qatar is the latest indication of this approach. Trump has repeatedly stated that the voices of Arab nations must be heard. No doubt, attracting Arab investment remains a clear priority for his administration, but he also understands that ignoring America’s Arab allies is unsustainable in the long run.
Still, the prevailing sentiment across the region is that the pro-Israel lobby in Washington remains the main obstacle to a balanced Middle East policy. As long as this powerful lobby can shape US decision-making, hopes for a stable and inclusive regional order will remain dim.
Thus, it can be concluded that Washington faces yet another rocky and arduous road in its quest to establish a security order in the Middle East—particularly given that its primary preoccupation is containing China.
Any large-scale, long-term military presence in the Middle East aimed at establishing a new order could benefit China and diminishes American focus on the Indo-Pacific region.