Iran-Russia nuclear ...
IRANDAILY: With Russia’s backing of Iran against Western attempts to revive international sanctions, what kind of outlook does this create for Tehran-Moscow strategic ties? Given that both countries are under Western sanctions, has this relationship entered a new phase of overlapping interests?
Cooperation between Iran and Russia largely follows its own logic, independent of wider international developments. Of course, global shifts can still leave their mark, either boosting or—at times—limiting cooperation. But their overall impact should not be overblown.
As for Moscow’s opposition to the snapback push, European powers are trying to frame it as a UN matter. Russia, however, has rejected this, stressing that the procedure outlined in Resolution 2231 was never followed, and that states failing to uphold their own commitments cannot expect Iran to honor its obligations.
This stance was expected, given both the nature of Iran-Russia relations and Moscow’s fraught ties with Western powers. For Tehran, it carries significant weight. Still, the real test lies ahead. Much will depend on how serious the obstacles posed by Western powers prove to be, and whether Russia can brush aside such hurdles or if they will end up constraining cooperation. Put differently, while Russia’s words are encouraging, only time will tell if they translate into action, especially since the West can always throw a wrench in the works of Iran-Russia collaboration, especially in light of the restored UN sanctions.
Under reinstated sanctions, how much can Iran count on Russia to strengthen its role in organizations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)?
Iran is already a member of both blocs, holding equal status with other participants. That means Tehran does not need Moscow’s endorsement to play an active role. The extent of Iran’s engagement will depend largely on how other members interpret the sanctions against it.
Since enforcement of UN resolutions is often left to individual states’ interpretations, Russia—as one member among many—may well exert a positive influence on how others interact with Iran. Yet, Iran now sits at the table as an equal to Russia, and its standing in these organizations ultimately depends on how fellow members choose to deal with Tehran.
With speculation about possible military tensions, would Russia play an active role in the event of conflict or stick to neutrality?
The 12-day war [waged by Israel and the US against Iran] last June offers some clues. Back then, Russia and China voiced their political opposition to any military aggression against Iran and engaged in diplomatic efforts to contain the crisis.
But expecting them to provide direct military backing in a future conflict would be unrealistic. Iran might strengthen defense cooperation with Moscow or Beijing before any escalation, but if an actual war were to erupt with the US or Israel, both Russia and China would weigh their own strategic considerations. It is unlikely they would wade into the conflict directly.
Now that UN sanctions are back in place despite Moscow declaring them null and void, will Russia continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran?
If by nuclear cooperation we mean power-plant construction, the record is clear. Iran already had contracts with Russia on Bushehr-2, and fresh agreements were just signed to build additional reactors. The trajectory so far shows that such projects are not easily derailed by sanctions. Provided there are no other barriers—financial or otherwise—Russia is ready to press ahead.
If, however, the question refers to other areas [like uranium enrichment], that is a different story. Iran and Russia have not engaged in joint technical projects in such fields for quite some time. Cooperation there has been limited to diplomatic coordination rather than hands-on nuclear operations.