European trio wants ...
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In practical terms, Iran’s economy would feel the sting of reimposed UN sanctions. Banking and trade ties would be choked, insurance coverage limited, and inspections of oil shipments ramped up—opening the door to seizure of Iranian vessels on the high seas, disrupting its commerce.
Moreover, a return to Chapter VII status at the UN would deal a blow to investor confidence, petrifying markets, scaring off global banks and corporations, and stalling foreign investment. For that reason, Iran has consistently shunned the activation of snapback, using all possible diplomatic levers to prevent Europe from pulling the trigger.
Yet the European troika must remember: Iran, both before and after the JCPOA, weathered the toughest sanctions the UN imposed and still managed to carve out its own path. Those sanctions fell short of their objectives, which is why the US and Europe even sat down at the negotiating table in the first place. Faced with two nuclear-armed enemies and standing firm on its lawful resistance, Iran considers such threats no longer credible. Snapback offers Europe nothing it does not already have.
If the snapback threat is meant as a diplomatic punishment, it will expose Europe’s ignorance of Iran’s strategic culture and its defiant posture. Iran refuses to be broken by unfounded sanctions, having spent two decades arguing convincingly that it has no need for punishment. Resorting to snapback would threaten the principle of “dignity” in its foreign policy doctrine, and Iran’s reaction would be even stronger.
Following the recent bombing of its nuclear sites, Iran does not see itself as a criminal—but as the aggrieved—thus, it will not back down, but press forward through alternative avenues.
For the EU and its members, invoking snapback now would mark a pivotal—and dangerous—turning point in relations with Iran. As Araghchi said: “it would spell the end of Europe’s role on Iran’s nuclear issue, and perhaps the darkest moment in Iran’s relations with the three European countries; a point from which recovery may never come.”
When the trio ultimately enforces snapback and returns Iran’s file to the UN Security Council, they will face a tough question: if Iran and the US soon resume talks and strike a deal, what position will Europe take—given its lack of independent leverage against Washington? Will they simply fall in line—and if so, with what standing? Will Iran ever trust a European troika that has been obstinate once more?
Tehran has so far shown goodwill toward Europe, seeking trust-based dialogue—but the ball is now in Europe’s court. At a time when the Middle East needs rational diplomacy from the West—and must drop coercion in favor of negotiation—snapback could seal a path to nowhere. Diplomacy remains the only viable path and no other road lies ahead.