Lack of Israeli ...
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The partition of the “Sick Man of Europe,” however, did not happen without a prelude. Britain fired the first shot at the heart of the Ottoman Empire by separating Egypt from it in 1882.
The second shot was fired in 1916, when Charles François Georges-Picot, the French foreign minister, and Sir Mark Sykes, the British foreign minister, signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement to divide the Ottoman Empire. The agreement reshaped the geography of the Middle East. Following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat, it served in 1918 as the principal framework for an understanding between the two colonial powers on administering Ottoman territories in the region.
Palestine, however, was among the territories that took a different path. Unlike Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and others, it did not become a state and remained under British Mandate rule until 1948.
Following this agreement, Arab territories were diverted from their natural course and took on a new shape through colonial border-making. More than a century after the Sykes-Picot Agreement, it remains deeply embedded in the Arab collective consciousness.
Some regard the agreement as the root cause of all the Middle East’s crises. This partition marked the beginning of a crisis across a vast region. Setting aside the European territories of the Ottoman Empire and the problems associated with them, it can be argued that the Arab Middle East entered an era of crisis through artificial border-making, a crisis that has continued in various forms to this day.
Against this backdrop, Hinnebusch argues that the Middle East was incorporated into the global division of labor as an exporter of commodities, particularly oil. In Wallerstein’s terms, it became part of the “periphery,” in contrast to the “core” represented by Western powers.
The proliferation of weak and insecure states, the arbitrary drawing of borders and the erosion of allegiance to the state, among other factors, led to the emergence of subnational identities. Where the concept of the “nation-state” itself was fraught with question marks, subnational groups assumed some of its functions. In other words, tasks that fell within the state’s responsibilities were carried out by one or more subnational groups.
Added to these factors were the establishment of Israel in May 1948 and external colonial interventions in the region’s affairs. Together, they created significant disparities between the imposed material order and nationalist and revisionist norms.
The result was a vicious cycle of violence and conflict, both within these systems and, at times, spilling over into the regional order. This gave rise to anti-hegemonic ideological approaches and pan-Arab movements. In Hinnebusch’s words, where revisionist states failed, subnational movements emerged to fill the “state-nation” gap. The emergence of Hezbollah, Hamas and many similar groups can be examined within this framework.
Could Trump’s plan pave the way for reviving the process of establishing an independent Palestinian state, or might it push the issue further to the margins of regional calculations?
The overall picture emerging from foreign reports is that there is no difference between Netanyahu’s coalition and Eisenkot’s camp on major domestic policy issues, including Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Perhaps the only figure who stands out in this regard is Yair Golan, leader of Israel’s Democrats party, who is willing to cooperate with the Palestinians.
At least so far, appearances suggest that the idea of a “Palestinian state” does not figure in the thinking of the others. I believe that even if Trump’s pressure leads to some kind of breakthrough on Gaza, everything will return to square one once his term in office ends.