Despite Republicans’ setback ...
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Such an achievement could come through either war or an agreement. What matters most to Trump is securing a major result, regardless of the means. So far, he has presented his claim of having “prevented Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb” as one of his achievements. However, this is not enough to convince public opinion in the United States or internationally.
Iran and the United States are currently pursuing two parallel tracks: military confrontation and negotiations toward an agreement. Either could materialize at any moment.
US officials have also sent conflicting signals about the state of negotiations. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently said there were no signs of an imminent agreement between the two countries. At the same time, Trump said he was highly unlikely to order fresh strikes against Iran if negotiations made progress and produced a strong deal.
As a result, we do not know the US administration’s actual position on negotiations with Iran. If we assess the current situation in light of the pattern set by the previous two wars, the likelihood of a US attack on Iran appears greater than that of an agreement.
Although recent diplomatic exchanges and efforts by Qatari officials offer grounds for optimism, the Qatari prime minister and foreign minister’s recent visit to Washington for meetings with Trump and Vice President JD Vance can also be compared to the visit by Oman’s foreign minister, who met Vance in the middle of negotiations, just days before the US war against Iran began on February 28. From this perspective, the visit by the senior Qatari officials should be seen as a warning sign.
If a new war breaks out, are we likely to see a short but intense confrontation, or could the conflict develop into a prolonged war of attrition?
If a new war begins, we will probably face a short but intense and highly destructive confrontation, based on what foreign media outlets have reported, citing informed sources.
Such a confrontation would be part of a broader strategy of prolonged military pressure by the United States and Israel against Iran. The aim would be to combine external political, military and economic pressure to push Iranian society toward unrest and confrontation.
What role will Israel play in shaping future developments? Given the domestic political changes following Israel’s elections, can we expect a shift in Tel Aviv’s approach toward Iran?
Israel is not merely an active player in this situation; it is the director behind the scenes. It appears to have successfully advanced its agenda by turning its war against Iran into a US-Iran confrontation and even a Trump-Iran conflict, while remaining outside the main theater and watching the clashes unfold among Iran, the United States and regional countries.
Any party that suffers damage in this confrontation stands to serve the interests of Israel’s right-wing government led by Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel regards the United States and regional countries, including those that have established relations with Tel Aviv, as either open or undeclared adversaries and welcomes any harm inflicted on them. From Israel’s perspective, Iranian attacks on the United States also deepen tensions and widen the rift between the two sides.
Moreover, the US-Israeli disputes with Iran constitute two separate issues. Although they overlap on certain matters, including the nuclear and missile programs, they are not entirely identical. Therefore, even if Washington reaches a comprehensive agreement with Tehran, Israel will continue various forms of activity against Iran, including military and paramilitary operations, if the deal fails to meet its demands.
As for the impact of Israel’s elections on the confrontation with Iran, if Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar party and the opposition camp against Netanyahu, succeeds in forming the next government, we could see several changes in Tel Aviv’s approach.
First, Israel would be less inclined to act unilaterally against Iran and would operate more closely within the framework of US policy toward Tehran. This could increase the chances of a US-Iran agreement. Relations between Washington and Tel Aviv would also become closer, with greater alignment between the Israeli government and Trump on various issues, including Iran. With Israel’s cooperation, Trump could more easily implement his peace plan for Gaza. At the same time, the prospects for closer Israeli relations with regional countries could improve.
Nevertheless, Israel’s military and intelligence services will continue to pursue their plans against Iran, regardless of whether Netanyahu or Eisenkot serves as prime minister. The methods, tactics and timelines may differ.
It should also be remembered that Eisenkot, a former chief of the Israeli military, was himself involved in intelligence, military and operational activities against Iran across the region. He does not fundamentally disagree with Netanyahu over the view that Iran poses a threat and is an adversary that Israel must confront. Their differences lie in the methods and approach.
How should Iran adjust its strategic calculations under the current circumstances?
First, Iran needs to develop a thorough and realistic understanding of regional developments and update its priorities accordingly. It should strengthen its decision-making and executive institutions, prevent the formation of regional coalitions against it, and bolster both its military and diplomatic instruments, using them in parallel.
Iran should also work to prevent regional countries from moving closer to Israel while ensuring that its own allies do not drift away.
Does maintaining the current state of neither war nor peace serve the interests of the parties involved, or is the situation gradually moving toward an inevitable confrontation? What factors could change this equation?
Maintaining the current situation primarily serves Israel’s interests because it allows the country to inflict the consequences and costs of war on Iran and regional states without having to engage in an actual war.
Trump, too, may support the continuation of this situation under certain circumstances, particularly in the Persian Gulf. His reasoning could be that such an arrangement would benefit US production and exports of oil, gas, petroleum products and other energy resources, while harming China’s economy by restricting its access to cheaper oil and gas supplies.
The continuation of this situation could also be part of a broader strategy to weaken Iran, alongside economic containment and continued military strikes.