Iran unlikely to ...
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Russia’s proposal also included neighboring countries such as Iraq and Jordan, alongside the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This would bring a range of different actors into discussions on Persian Gulf security.
Lavrov reiterated Russia’s emphasis on collective security at the fifth Russia-GCC meeting in Doha. In some respects, Moscow’s approach resembles Iran’s Hormuz Peace Endeavor, which was introduced during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani.
Under the Hormuz Peace Endeavor, Iran also emphasized the role of the UN secretary-general, drawing on UN Security Council Resolution 598. Article 8 of the resolution provides for the secretary-general to take an initiative addressing issues such as terrorism and environmental security, with a comprehensive approach to security and the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council. But the initiative was not welcomed at the time, particularly by the Arab states.
However, following the 40-day war and the more recent conflict, some differences have emerged between Iran’s and Russia’s approaches.
Russia emphasizes freedom of navigation in line with its stated commitment to international law and the UN Charter. It also appears to favor a consensus-based approach to managing the Strait of Hormuz, involving Iran and the GCC member states.
Iran, by contrast, currently insists that the management of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is a matter for Iran and Oman. Tehran intends to engage in dialogue with the Arab states under the formula agreed upon by the two countries.
At present, Iran does not appear inclined to welcome Moscow’s proposal, and there are indications that it has not done so.
Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, attended a meeting of Russian and GCC foreign ministers in Manama before traveling to Tehran. Given that the Arab states of the Persian Gulf also have their own security concerns and demands, what do these parallel diplomatic engagements between Moscow, Tehran and Arab capitals reveal about Russia’s approach to regional developments? Is Moscow seeking to establish a common security framework, or is it seeking to strengthen its influence and role as a mediator while maintaining ties with different sides?
Russia is currently seeking to position itself as a leading player in Persian Gulf affairs. Given its close relations with Iran and its good ties with GCC members, Moscow is trying to find a formula that can bring stability to the region.
In doing so, it also seeks to weaken the United States’ position. Following the 40-day war, questions were raised about Washington’s ability to ensure the security of these countries, and Russia appears to be seeking to capitalize on what it sees as a weakness exposed during the conflict.
Moscow wants to present itself not only as an option for bilateral security and military cooperation with these countries, but also as a potential strategic partner in a broader sense. It is also seeking to play a role through a multilateral mechanism that could bring Iran and the Arab states together within a forum of Russia’s own design and help stabilize the region.
However, given Iran’s perspective and the impact of the war on the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, it is unlikely that the Iranian and Russian approaches will converge on this matter. Iran views the strait as a strategic card and intends to use it in regional and international calculations.
With Iran-US nuclear negotiations currently at an impasse, what scope does Russia have to facilitate dialogue and bridge the differences between Tehran and Washington? Can Lavrov’s visit be viewed in this context?
On the nuclear issue, Russia has repeatedly offered to take custody of Iran’s stockpile of 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, with the aim of resolving one of the main sticking points in the negotiations. Moscow played a similar role during the negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and it remains willing to do so again.
Recent remarks by Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, following his meeting with Pakistani first army chief Asim Munir, have shed light on the connection between the nuclear issue and Lavrov’s visit. Rezaei said Iran would not allow even a particle of its enriched uranium to be taken out of the country. This also indicates that Munir, during his visit to Iran, placed emphasis on the nuclear issue and the removal of enriched uranium from Iran.
Iran wants the issue of the Strait of Hormuz to be resolved through a separate negotiation, in return for the lifting of the US naval blockade, the removal of oil sanctions and the easing of certain other restrictions. This is outlined in Iran’s so-called seven-day plan, under which the strait would be reopened after seven days, allowing the next phase of nuclear negotiations to begin.
The United States, however, currently believes that the naval blockade has been effective and that a substantial portion of shipping is being conducted through the southern corridor and along the coast of Oman. Washington therefore sees no need to offer concessions by lifting or easing the blockade, or by relaxing sanctions, in exchange for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Instead, the US position is that such concessions should be tied to nuclear negotiations and the nuclear commitments Iran is expected to make.
In light of Rezaei’s remarks, it appears that a nuclear arrangement is under consideration and that Washington is seeking an initial nuclear concession, namely the removal of enriched uranium from Iran. The United States could then present this as an achievement to the American public ahead of the elections and use it as a political asset.
Iran, however, does not appear willing to agree to the removal of its enriched uranium. This suggests that Russia’s proposal has also failed to gain Tehran’s acceptance. The approach currently under consideration appears to be a middle-ground formula: the two sides would move into negotiations on the details only after agreeing on a set of basic principles, particularly concerning Iran’s nuclear program. Discussions on centrifuges, enrichment and other nuclear issues would then take place after Iran accepts those principles.
In return, the United States would likely offer concessions, potentially including the lifting of the naval blockade or the removal of some sanctions, including oil sanctions.