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Nevertheless, the key measure of genuine progress is not simply the holding of high-level meetings, but a shift in the parties’ positions, agreement on the sequencing of commitments or the establishment of specific implementation arrangements. Until such evidence emerges, it is more accurate to speak of an expanded capacity for mediation and efforts to manage the costs of the crisis than to suggest that negotiations are firmly on track.
Statements have emerged about the possibility of the United States using extremely powerful bunker-buster bombs, including the weapon known as the “mother of all bombs,” to target Iran’s nuclear facilities. How should these threats be assessed?
These threats should be assessed both in the context of psychological and diplomatic pressure and in terms of the possibility of military escalation. Raising military options can be intended to increase the perceived cost of Iran’s resistance and strengthen Washington’s position in negotiations. However, considering a military option should not be equated with a definitive decision to carry it out.
There is an important technical distinction in this regard. The GBU-43/B, known as the “mother of all bombs,” is a munition with an extremely high explosive yield, but it differs from the specialized penetrator designed to strike hardened, deeply buried targets, known as the GBU-57. Therefore, the possibility of using the GBU-43/B does not, in itself, mean that it would be capable of reliably destroying Iran’s hardened underground nuclear facilities. From this perspective, talk of using this weapon against Iran’s nuclear sites may be more of a propaganda or psychological warfare tactic.
Strategically, the central issue is not simply a weapon’s destructive power, but the relationship between the military objective and its political consequences. An attack on sensitive infrastructure could cause significant damage, but it would not necessarily lead to a lasting resolution of the disputes or eliminate Iran’s strategic capabilities. Conversely, such an attack could trigger retaliation, widen the conflict and sharply increase risks to shipping and regional infrastructure.
Military threats can also have a dual effect on diplomacy. On the one hand, they may be used to extract concessions in negotiations. On the other, they can erode the trust necessary for an agreement and lead the other side to conclude that the threat of another attack would remain even after a deal was reached. This is particularly important when the core dispute is not merely about a temporary halt to hostilities, but also about guarantees that commitments will be honored and that the crisis will not return in the future.
How could the US midterm elections and the domestic political considerations facing the administration affect Washington’s decisions regarding Iran’s proposal and its approach to Tehran?
The November 3 midterm elections could affect the timing and form of the US administration’s decisions, but they will not necessarily determine the direction of its policy. Under current circumstances, the Trump administration faces a clear political challenge: how to contain the economic costs of the war without being accused at home of backing down in the face of Iran.
Rising energy prices, pressure on households and concerns about a prolonged war increase the administration’s incentive to ease the crisis before the election. Donald Trump has also explicitly stated that the United States would not attack Iran before the election and has referred to ongoing talks. This position suggests that electoral considerations can influence the timing of military action, although they do not, in themselves, guarantee an agreement. At the same time, his emphasis on maintaining the blockade shows that refraining from a military attack does not necessarily mean abandoning instruments of pressure.
Another important factor is the distinction between reaching an agreement before the election and making decisions afterward. The US administration may seek to secure a temporary period of calm before voters go to the polls, while postponing the resolution of fundamental disputes to later stages. Conversely, if it judges the political cost of an agreement to be greater than that of continuing the confrontation, it may prolong negotiations or rely more heavily on pressure tactics. Electoral considerations could therefore both strengthen the incentive to contain the crisis and limit the concessions the Trump administration is willing to accept.
From Iran’s perspective, US foreign policy should not be interpreted solely through the lens of electoral competition. A change in the composition of Congress does not, by itself, mean an immediate shift in Washington’s policy toward Tehran, although it can affect congressional oversight, budgetary decisions and the political environment in which the administration makes decisions.
Overall, the election could create an opportunity to contain the crisis temporarily, but it offers no guarantee of a lasting agreement. Turning this opportunity into a tangible outcome requires a framework that phases the implementation of commitments and makes them verifiable. Otherwise, electoral considerations may merely change the timing and form of the next confrontation rather than bring the underlying disputes to an end.