Iran’s northern corridors ...

Page 1

This has created new opportunities for cooperation between Iran and the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. For example, Caucasian countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia can use Iranian territory to connect with Turkey and Europe. They can also reach South Asia, including Pakistan and Afghanistan, through Iran for both transportation and trade.
Iran, in turn, can connect to the Black Sea and Russia through the Caucasus. Via Azerbaijan, Iran can ship its goods to Russia, while routes through Azerbaijan and Georgia allow Iranian goods to reach the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi. From there, commercial shipments can continue across the Black Sea.
The situation is even more favorable in Central Asia, where both road and rail networks are available. For example, a railway route originating in China can enter Iran through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan before connecting to Iran’s nationwide rail network. From there, goods can be transported onward to Europe, Turkey or South Asia. The route also enables Iran to export its own goods to Central Asian countries and even China by rail.
Road transport is another available option. These days, Iranian and foreign trucks can be seen traveling along highways leading to border crossings in the region, and their numbers have been increasing.
In addition, Iran maintains maritime links across the Caspian Sea with Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. These countries can use the route to export goods to and import goods from Iran, while Iran can transport cargo to ports in each of these countries.
Under current circumstances, consultations between Iran and these countries through the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development, alongside efforts by the Foreign Ministry to establish the necessary groundwork for resolving logistical problems more quickly, are particularly important. With routes through the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf currently facing difficulties due to US aggression and the military presence near the Strait of Hormuz, these countries can also turn to Iran and alternative routes for their exports and imports.
Russia faces a similar situation. It has direct maritime links with Iran across the Caspian Sea, as well as connections through Azerbaijan and another route that runs toward Uzbekistan before entering Iran through Turkmenistan.
Russia, like Iran, is operating under sanctions. Consequently, cooperation between the two countries, both of which are facing sanctions-related pressures, is particularly important for maintaining transportation links and commercial exchanges. In this regard, the two countries appear to be activating new routes at an increasing pace and seeking to iron out the problems affecting maritime and land transportation.
As far as possible, Iran seeks to avoid competing with Russia, Turkey, China, Central Asia and the Caucasus, instead making cooperation the basis of its approach. Iran believes that all countries lose out when competition, particularly unconstructive rivalry, takes precedence. By contrast, interaction within a framework of cooperation would undoubtedly bring greater benefits to all the countries concerned.
Accordingly, Iran currently faces no economic challenges with Russia, Turkey, China, Central Asia and the Caucasus. There are, of course, some political differences between Iran and Turkey over the use of the Zangezur route. However, as the route has yet to be built, these issues are not currently at the forefront and have receded into the background.
Iran has also participated in meetings under the 3+3 format, which brings together Iran, Russia and Turkey as countries outside the Caucasus, alongside Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as the countries of the region. The purpose of these meetings is to encourage greater cooperation. Holding more such meetings and strengthening the format would be important for deepening Iran’s ties with these countries, as well as with Central Asian nations.
Iran’s membership in regional groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Economic Cooperation Organization can also help Central Asian countries, the Caucasus states, Russia and Iran expand their cooperation at this critical juncture. Such engagement, backed by political will among the participating countries, would undoubtedly strengthen regional cooperation and pave the way for more durable economic arrangements.
Overall, it appears that although the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has created economic difficulties and challenges for Iran and regional countries, particularly those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, it has also prompted them to consider closer cooperation and explore alternative ways of working together. This is a positive development, as once the Strait of Hormuz is reopened, the new routes established as alternatives during this period could complement existing ones and help boost economic activity in Iran, Central Asian and Caucasian countries, Russia and China.

Search
Date archive