Military power holds ...
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At least in theory and on paper, the possibility of a major Saudi offensive has been raised. However, it remains to be seen how the realities on the ground will play out.
Could Houthis’ recent advances in western Yemen and their approach toward routes leading to Taiz and Aden strengthen the group’s position in any future political negotiations and alter the country’s internal equation? Or will divisions among the various anti-Houthi forces prevent the formation of a cohesive military front?
There is no doubt that Ansarullah’s advances could give the group a strong bargaining chip in any future negotiations. An important point that should be highlighted is Ansarullah’s smart and diplomatic approach.
After capturing “Mocha” and areas overlooking Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, the group entered negotiations with the United States in Oman and assured Washington that international shipping would remain free to pass, while making clear that its firm stance was directed only at Saudi Arabia and aimed at breaking the blockade.
This shows that, alongside its military capabilities, Ansarullah also possesses diplomatic acumen, which could serve as a model for other actors as well.
As for the second part of the question, there is already no unified front. To explain this more clearly, there are currently three factions in Yemen, apart from areas under Ansarullah’s control.
A) Saudi-backed groups, including the “Islah Party,” the “National Resistance Forces” led by Tareq Saleh, the nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the “Yemeni National Army,” made up of remnants of the former army.
B) The UAE-backed group known as the “Southern Transitional Council” (STC).
C) Other militant groups, including “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP) and possibly Daesh affiliates.
Each of these groups also contains its own factions and internal groupings. Saudi Arabia is therefore seeking to organize these disparate groups and bring them together for a major battle against Ansarullah. In this regard, the Saudi kingdom is pursuing “de-escalation” with the UAE so that it can also mobilize UAE-backed forces against Ansarullah.
Given the importance of Taiz and Bab al-Mandab, what military and political advantages would control of these areas give the Houthis, and what impact would losing them have on the Yemeni government?
Naturally, Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea are a vital “chokepoint” or “lifeline” for the Saudis. If Ansarullah manages to consolidate its control over these areas and beat back a potential Saudi offensive, it would have the upper hand in the geopolitical chess game with Saudi Arabia.
This would allow Ansarullah to enter into a bargaining process with its larger neighbor: lifting the blockade in exchange for easing pressure on Saudi Arabia. If this becomes consolidated, Ansarullah would be recognized as a player and a negotiating party.
Given the escalation in fighting and the worsening humanitarian situation, could the current circumstances once again push Yemen toward a war of attrition? Or is there still a possibility of returning to a ceasefire and a political process?
The reality is that since 2014, when the Saudi-led coalition began its offensive against Yemen, the country has entered a new phase of humanitarian crisis and, of course, a war of attrition. Therefore, Yemen has not just entered a war of attrition now. This process began in 2014 and has now reached its peak.
This war of attrition has had several consequences. First, it has left 18 million people facing acute food insecurity, meaning they do not have reliable access to sufficient food. Families are unable to afford even one kilogram of flour, sugar or rice.
Second, it has dealt a heavy blow to Yemen’s economy and disrupted businesses. A recent example of this is the 10-percent increase in fuel prices, which has led to “intensified hunger.” The rise in fuel prices has undoubtedly affected food prices as well and worsened hunger among families.
As for whether there is still an opportunity to return to a ceasefire, that depends on several other factors.
First, there is a perception among Saudi leaders and other regional actors that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy force. On that basis, negotiations should first be held with Iran and then with the Houthis.
Given the interconnectedness of regional crises — the linkage between the fronts in Yemen, Iran, Lebanon and elsewhere — and in light of US pressure on Iran, regional actors believe that Iran is under pressure and may be unable to come to the Houthis’ aid.
Saudi Arabia has therefore seized the opportunity to put Ansarullah on the back foot in Yemen. With this perception prevailing, despite the Houthis’ advances and in light of recent Saudi attacks and those carried out by its proxies, it appears that the window for a ceasefire has been missed. Military power is now the only factor capable of determining the balance of power between the two sides.
Given that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other regional actors have had different experiences with developments in Yemen, could an escalation of the war further widen differences among them over Yemen’s future?
These two countries became embroiled in a dispute after the Houthis began advancing. According to some analysts, one of the reasons for the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC and its increased activity in Africa is the intensification of competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen.
Saudi forces pinned down UAE-backed forces in a major air campaign, which in turn heightened tensions between the two countries.
However, it appears that relations between the two countries have now moved onto a path of de-escalation, following a visit by Mansour bin Zayed, Vice President of the UAE, to Saudi Arabia and his meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, as fears over the Houthis’ advance have prompted both countries to step up their efforts.
Therefore, the prospect of convergence between the two countries is considerable.