Iran’s choice on ...
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Their ultimate objective is to align their national interests with the transition in the regional order as the global order itself undergoes change, while securing a share of the distribution of power within the emerging system.
So what is Iran’s way forward? Should it join or stay out?
In either case, the strategy of resistance risks disruption.
Under the current circumstances, Iran could choose to play by the rules of Chinese Go and step out of the game for a round, leaving the request unanswered. But given the existing conditions, such an approach would amount to even greater passivity on Iran’s part.
Alternatively, like turning the board over in a game of Ludo, Iran could attempt to create an agreement of its own. Yet given the current circumstances, including the conditions surrounding oil sales, Western pressure on Iraq and the failure to recognize Yemen’s Ansarullah as a government, such an option is not realistically available to the two actors supporting Iran’s strategy of shaping the regional order.
There is, however, another possibility.
Iran could put forward a proposal that would strategically redesign the objectives of the Mecca Pact. It could argue that Iranian membership would contribute to reducing tensions across the region and consolidating security and stability.
At the same time, Iran could use membership as diplomatic leverage by making its participation conditional on the simultaneous inclusion of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt.
Such a move could foil the attempt to use the Mecca Pact to create a diplomatic dead end for Iran and undermine the legitimacy of the resistance. At the same time, it could turn a potential crisis into an opportunity for regional action in response to the Abraham Accords.
This would allow Iran to demonstrate and consolidate its regional power while moving toward a model of power distribution it considers desirable. In this way, Iran could pursue de-escalation while retaining its position as a regional actor capable of helping shape the emerging order.
China could also be brought into the equation as a superpower operating at a higher level of the international order. Its involvement could help balance power in the global system vis-à-vis the United States, with corresponding effects on the regional order, and could strengthen the durability of the order taking shape in the region.
The proposed inclusion of Syria and Egypt could create further diplomatic leverage.
Syria’s inclusion could provide a bargaining chip for securing formal regional recognition of Syria under the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa. It could also create an opening for relations and allow Syria’s geopolitical potential to be used to strengthen the resistance.
In Egypt’s case, the proposal could, for the first time since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, create the basis for establishing a diplomatic partnership with Cairo and taking bilateral relations to a new level.
The same approach could also help shape the foreign policy of the Lebanese government in a direction supportive of the resistance.
If the three existing members accepted such a proposal, the Mecca Pact would have to be strategically recalibrated in line with its revised objectives.
If they rejected it, the three countries themselves would be placed in a position of diplomatic passivity.