New energy rivalry:
Shift from fuels to chains
By Mohammadreza Hosseini Aliabad
Researcher in int'l economics
For decades, the world's energy editorials revolved around a simple question: will oil become expensive or cheap? Will OPEC cut production or raise it? But as 2026 approaches, these questions no longer explain the backbone of global energy developments. What is happening today is a deeper and quieter transformation: the world has moved from competition over "fuel" to competition over "chains." The supply chain for critical minerals, the production chain for batteries and electrolyzers, the enrichment and nuclear fuel chain, and the transmission and storage chain for electricity. Any country that holds a key node in these chains retains the real trump card in the power equations of the twenty-first century.
The first sign of this shift can be seen in the struggle over critical minerals. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and rare earth elements are no longer marginal commodities; they are key inputs for the energy transition. China, by dominating the refining of these materials—particularly in graphite and rare earth elements—effectively controls the gateway to the global battery industry. Europe and the United States, through legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act, are attempting to reduce this dependency, but building an alternative chain requires years and tens of billions of dollars in investment. The result is that, instead of competition over the price of oil, we are now witnessing competition over long-term lithium contracts and processing plants.
The second front is nuclear fuel. After the energy shock of 2022, many European countries that had once rapidly distanced themselves from nuclear energy have now returned to it. But this return comes with an important difference: Russia remains the world's largest provider of uranium enrichment services, and Europe and the United States are striving to rebuild their own enrichment capacity. At the same time, a new generation of small modular reactors has entered the scene—a technology that could shift the geography of electricity generation from gigantic power plants to cities and small factories. Competition over this technology is competition over influence in developing countries.
The third front is electricity itself. The world is rapidly electrifying: vehicles, heating, industries, and even artificial intelligence data centers. This growth in demand has turned transmission networks into a new bottleneck. Submarine cables, cross-border transmission lines, and storage batteries now carry as much geopolitical significance as oil pipelines. A country that can supply stable and cheap electricity attracts energy-intensive industries to itself and moves up the global value chain.
The fourth transformation is the emergence of "energy as a weapon" in a new form. Oil and gas sanctions are no longer one-dimensional tools. Today, exports of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and even grid management software can be subject to restrictions. China, by dominating the production of clean energy equipment, has the capacity to regulate the pace of energy transition in other parts of the world. In contrast, the United States and Europe are trying to strengthen domestic production through tariffs and subsidies. This techno-trade war raises the cost of energy transition in developing countries and deepens the North-South divide.
But perhaps the most important change is the change in actors. For half a century, OPEC and the International Energy Agency were the two main pillars of energy governance. Today, new actors have entered: technology companies that manufacture batteries and software, investment funds that invest in critical mines, and mineral-producing countries seeking a larger share of the value chain. Indonesia, with its ban on raw nickel exports, Chile, with the nationalization of part of its lithium, and Namibia, with restrictions on lithium exports, all demonstrate that the era of the "raw material exporter" is coming to an end. These countries want battery factories, not just mines.
In such a world, energy security no longer means possessing oil reserves; it means having diversity in the supply chain, refining capacity, battery technology, and a resilient electricity grid. A country that has only oil may, in the coming decade, be more vulnerable than a country that has graphite, lithium, and engineering capability. This shift is rewriting the map of global power.
Therefore, today's energy editorial should not focus solely on the price of a barrel and OPEC quotas. It must look at lithium mines in the Atacama Desert, battery factories in Shenzhen, enrichment centrifuges in Europe, and submarine cables in the Mediterranean. The world of energy has moved beyond competition over fuel and has arrived at competition over chains. Those who grasp this shift sooner will carry greater weight in tomorrow's equations. Those who remain in the oil paradigm may realize too late that the game has changed.