Russia can be ...
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This helps explain why Russia can be an important partner for Iran without necessarily becoming an unlimited strategic ally.
“Russia does not accept the US-led liberal order and seeks, in various ways, to challenge it,” Baghi said. “At the same time, pragmatism in Russian foreign policy means that partnerships and alliances are pursued as long as they serve Russia’s interests.”
That principle is particularly relevant as Iran seeks to expand economic cooperation with Russia in areas such as trade, energy, transportation, essential goods and financial arrangements. Such cooperation can help both countries reduce some of the effects of Western sanctions and create alternative channels for economic exchange.
But Baghi cautions against interpreting this cooperation as evidence that Moscow is prepared to confront Washington on Iran’s behalf.
“Given that Iran is under Western sanctions and is politically considered a high-risk country, Russia’s foreign policy behavior shows that it does not want to tighten its relationship with Iran without limits,” he said.
Russia’s own confrontation with the West has made tactical partnerships more valuable. Moscow needs relationships that can support its economic and political interests while avoiding unnecessary escalation with the United States and its allies. Iran, in this context, can be an important partner, but the relationship remains subject to Russia’s strategic calculations.
“Assistance to Iran, in economic, commercial, political and military areas, will go as far as it does not lead Russia into a direct confrontation with the United States,” Baghi said.
The distinction between tactical and strategic cooperation is therefore central to the future of Tehran-Moscow relations. The two countries have significant areas of overlapping interest, but Baghi argues that this should not automatically be described as a comprehensive strategic partnership.
Russia’s definition of a strategic partner, he notes, has a specific meaning. Even Moscow’s relationship with China, despite being described by both sides as a strategic partnership, is influenced by necessity and changing interests. “I believe Russia’s partnership with Belarus is more strategic than its partnership with China,” he said.
This does not reduce the importance of Russia for Iran. Rather, it suggests that Tehran can benefit from cooperation with Moscow by focusing on areas where interests genuinely converge. Trade, energy, transport links and financial mechanisms can provide practical opportunities, particularly when both sides seek to reduce their exposure to Western pressure.
At the same time, Russia itself remains part of the international system it criticizes. This is one of the main limitations on the emergence of a completely separate economic order outside Western structures.
“Although countries such as Russia and China are critics of the current world order, they have no choice but to play a role within the same structure and the same order,” Baghi said.
In his view, Russia’s position as a major power also rests primarily on its political and military capabilities rather than on economic or technological strength. He argues that Moscow’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its nuclear arsenal give it a level of strategic weight that cannot easily be ignored.
“I place Russia, with some qualification, among the great powers,” Baghi said. “Without its veto power and nuclear weapons, it would not have much to say in the global economy or economic and technological innovation.”
This balance also affects Russia’s relations with Washington. Despite their differences, Baghi believes that the two sides have reasons to maintain broader channels of communication because of Russia’s position in the international system.
“There is undoubtedly coordination between Moscow and Washington at the broader level, regardless of who occupies the White House,” he said. “This coordination also applies to Iran.”
For Iran, the message is therefore one of opportunity combined with realism. Russia can provide meaningful economic, political and security support, and closer cooperation can help Tehran expand its room for maneuver under sanctions. But Moscow will ultimately measure every step against its own national interests.
The future of Iran-Russia relations, in Baghi’s assessment, is therefore more likely to be shaped by a steady expansion of practical cooperation than by the creation of an unlimited alliance. The two countries have strong reasons to work together, but the durability of that partnership will depend on how effectively they align their interests while preserving their independent strategic choices.