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My guess is that the pressure the Americans have imposed and continue to impose — including the military option, sanctions and the blockade — is ultimately aimed at reaching a “favorable” agreement with Iran – one that serves US interests to the greatest possible extent. Or, if the memorandum is to be restored, Washington wants that return to take place under conditions that it defines.
It is unlikely that the strategy the Americans have once again adopted, based on suffocating economic pressure on Iran, can achieve their objectives — particularly if their goal is to force Iran to comply with or surrender to Washington’s maximalist demands.
Therefore, the US is seeking to pile on maximum pressure in all areas, in order to extract the greatest possible concessions from Iran while giving the fewest concessions in return. The Islamabad memorandum, by contrast, was the opposite.
Under such circumstances, returning to the memorandum would be very difficult for Trump, particularly because he came under heavy criticism, attacks and pressure in the US immediately after signing it.
However, if Iran concludes that it should reach a deal, I believe Trump will ultimately have no better option and will inevitably have to accept it.
Therefore, it can be said that Trump’s position is one in which he is effectively playing a push-and-pull game over the memorandum.
The US has recently shifted the nature of its aggressive policy from military to economic pressure. How likely is this policy to succeed, and given the impatience we have seen from Trump, how much time do you think he will give this new policy to take effect?
There is serious doubt about whether the US can really pressure all countries and build a global consensus against Iran.
There is no doubt that this policy will deliver psychological shocks to Iran’s economy and put pressure on both the government and the people. But the strategic question is whether it can actually bring the US to its main objective — forcing Iran to comply — or to even broader goals, namely surrender. There is serious doubt about this too.
This is particularly because sanctions are a slow-acting policy and do not produce results in the short term, while Trump needs policies that deliver quick returns. Therefore, it is unlikely that sanctions will achieve the objectives Trump is pursuing, other than creating pressure and imposing costs on Iran.
To what extent do you agree with the assessment that Trump is seeking to buy time to get past the electoral environment in the US and will ultimately launch a third war against Iran?
It is very difficult to make a prediction in this regard. Nevertheless, strategic policymaking should not underestimate or ignore the possibility; rather, prepare to deal with it.
The possibility of war will depend to a large extent on the outcome of the US congressional midterm elections. There are two possible outcomes: Democrats could take both chambers, or Republicans could retain control of both.
If the Democrats win, some believe this could tie Trump’s hands when it comes to pursuing a war, or at least constrain him.
Others, however, put forward the opposite hypothesis. They believe that if Republicans lose the House and the Senate, Trump’s policy could become more aggressive because he would have nothing left to lose.
In either scenario, war remains a possibility, though its likelihood cannot yet be assessed with certainty.
Iran and Oman say they are nearing the scheduled release of a joint statement on the mechanism for the management of the Strait of Hormuz. How likely are the talks to succeed this time? What role could a potential agreement play in resuming Iran-US talks and ultimately reopening the Strait of Hormuz?
The possibility of a bilateral agreement between Iran and Oman does not depend solely on the two countries.
Iran adopts policies based on its national interests and enjoys freedom of action, but Oman does not have the same degree of freedom of action under these circumstances. As has been seen, Trump has threatened Oman militarily twice so far.
Oman is currently under pressure from several directions. First, it is under US pressure and must fully take Trump’s interests into account in any decision. Second, it is under pressure from the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and must in some way accommodate their interests as well. Third, there are the other users of the Strait of Hormuz.
Therefore, Oman has to reconcile and balance the interests of Iran, the Arab states, the US and other users of the Strait of Hormuz. In reality, it is not the sole decision-maker.
Despite all this, I believe there is a possibility of success and an agreement between Iran and Oman. If Iran and Oman reach an agreement and the US at least does not oppose it, it could pave the way for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the resumption of Iran-US talks. Yet, an agreement between Iran and Oman is necessary, but not sufficient.