Access to benefits ...
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Following the FATF-related restrictions, Iran’s financial connections became even more limited, leaving the banking sector ill-prepared to establish broad-based relations with the rest of the world. Therefore, the quality of banking services must be upgraded rapidly. This includes workforce training, financial interactions with foreign institutions, foreign-language proficiency, and access to modern technologies used in the international banking system.
In addition, while many Iranian traders are experienced and have strong commercial track records, years of declining trade—particularly with European countries—mean that further training may be necessary. Such efforts would help merchants coordinate more effectively with domestic institutions and ministries involved in foreign trade, while also familiarizing them with the frameworks governing international commerce.
At the same time, the quality of services provided by Iran’s customs administration must be improved. Customs offices are among the most important gateways for the movement of goods and services, yet they too require fundamental modernization. Personnel need enhanced training, improved language skills, and greater familiarity with modern techniques and procedures. Iran’s customs system, much like other administrative and executive structures, suffers from serious inefficiencies that have become major obstacles to development. In addition to streamlining processes and shortening service-delivery timelines, customs authorities must be upgraded both technologically and in terms of expertise.
Finally, fundamental reforms are required across the inefficient bureaucratic structures that exist throughout the country’s institutions. Current bureaucratic systems must be overhauled, particularly within agencies and ministries involved in foreign trade and foreign investment. From the Central Bank and other banks to the Ministries of Industry, Mine and Trade, Economy and Finance, the Plan and Budget Organization, and the customs administration, all of these bodies need to streamline their bureaucratic structures, improve efficiency, train their personnel, and adopt modern technologies to facilitate international economic engagement.
What role will Arab countries play in this fund? Are they expected to transfer Iran’s unfrozen assets into the fund, provide capital themselves, or participate in managing and overseeing investments?
As an economist, I have no detailed information available beyond what has been reported in the media. It should be emphasized, however, that if the prerequisites outlined earlier are met, not only Arab countries but nations across the world—especially Western countries whose trade relations with Iran have declined sharply over the years—would be highly interested in investing in Iran.
Many of these countries are grappling with economic stagnation and are actively seeking destinations with strong investment potential. Under current circumstances, Iran could become an investment paradise due to years of sanctions, persistently low levels of investment, and the vast untapped capacities that exist throughout the economy. The damage caused by the recent war has further expanded both the need for investment and the opportunities available.
As a result, interest would not be limited to Arab states. Many Western countries, including the United States, as well as Eastern economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia, all possess substantial capital and are constantly looking for promising investment destinations. If the necessary conditions are put in place, there will be competition among countries to invest in Iran.
Given that a significant portion of US primary and secondary sanctions against Iran remains in place, under what legal and executive mechanisms could American and non-American companies participate in projects financed by this fund?
The necessary and sufficient condition—and indeed the primary prerequisite—for Iran to benefit from international trade and economic cooperation, whether through foreign investment or trade in goods and services, is the absence of political and economic restrictions in its relations with the outside world.
In the short term, the first requirement for placing Iran on a path toward development is ending the long-standing state of “neither war nor peace.” Relatively speaking, part of that objective has now been achieved. However, the next essential step is the complete removal of sanctions affecting the country’s economy and political relations. Third, Iran’s regional and extra-regional tensions must be resolved, and normal political relations with all countries—particularly those in the region—must be restored.
There is therefore little doubt that, following the end of the war and any potential final agreement reached after the 60-day negotiation period, sanctions relief would have to be the next step.
Iran’s political relations, particularly with Arab countries that were seriously affected by the conflict, must also return to normal. This is especially true in the case of the United Arab Emirates, a country on which Iran has long depended heavily for trade, both financially and through its ports.
Otherwise, even if a $300 billion fund is established, without these prerequisites in place, the resources would either be dissipated without delivering meaningful results, leaving Iran indebted, or fail to be utilized at all. In either case, such a fund would fail to bring about meaningful structural change in Iran’s economy.