Israel steps up ...
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The prospects for ending the war in Lebanon depend on several factors. The first is the extent to which the United States, as a party to the understanding with Iran, is willing to pressure Israel to uphold the initial arrangement and constrain its freedom of action in southern Lebanon. Israel has demonstrated that it will make considerable efforts to preserve its ability to act independently in this arena. Nevertheless, if US pressure is serious, it can genuinely influence Israeli conduct. For example, if Trump is truly determined, he can certainly prevent Israeli attacks on Beirut.
Another factor is the course of negotiations between the Lebanese government and Israel, which in turn depends on Israel's own behavior and whether it is prepared to withdraw from occupied territories.
Ultimately, while an agreement may impose certain constraints on Israeli behavior in Lebanon, it is unlikely to guarantee a comprehensive ceasefire or ensure that Israel refrains from violating it.
If Iran and the United States reach an understanding that includes Lebanon as part of the arrangement, to what extent would Washington have the capacity or political will to restrain Israeli military actions in Lebanon? What does the history of US-Israeli relations suggest about Tel Aviv's room for independent action under such circumstances?
Based on the conduct that has been observed so far, Trump has not taken particularly serious steps to limit Israel's freedom of action in Lebanon, especially given that Israel has informed Washington ahead of its operations on each occasion.
Trump's objections to Israeli attacks have consistently come after the strikes were carried out, when he subsequently called for them to stop. If he is genuinely committed to implementing the agreement, however, he should prevent such attacks before they take place.
On the other hand, the proximity of nationwide elections also compels Netanyahu to project a degree of independence in his decision-making.
More broadly, how does Israel view a potential understanding between Iran and the United States? What threats and opportunities does it see in such an arrangement?
Israel opposes the underlying approach guiding an Iran-US agreement. It favors a one-sided arrangement tantamount to a capitulation document—what it refers to in the nuclear sphere as the "Libya model." Under that model, a country's entire nuclear capability would be packed into crates and shipped out of the country.
The agreement currently under discussion, however, is not based on a one-sided logic and includes benefits for the Iranian side as well. That is something Israel will find deeply unpalatable.
The lifting of some sanctions on Iran, the release of frozen Iranian assets, the end of restrictions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, the eventual withdrawal of US forces from areas surrounding Iran's borders, and the separation of nuclear negotiations from the initial understanding all run counter to Israel's preferred model.