A win-win opening ...
Page 1
Some analyses attribute the primary mediation role to China and view Pakistan as acting within that framework. Given the perspective that Pakistan is operating more in line with the United States, how can the role of China-Pakistan relations be explained?
This proposition is partly valid, but it does not carry decisive weight. Pakistan has traditionally sought to calibrate its positions in a way that does not alienate any of the main pillars of the equation. Evidence suggests that Islamabad engaged in regional consultations before formal exchanges between Iran and the United States began, including hosting meetings attended by foreign ministers of key regional countries such as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
Following these consultations, Pakistani officials traveled to China and put forward proposals that were ultimately not accepted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. This process shows that Pakistan is trying to maintain an active role while not losing China’s support, thereby striking a balance across its foreign policy orientations.
However, under current conditions, the operational role Pakistan is pursuing appears to be defined primarily within the framework of US expectations and demands. Statements by the US president further reinforce this perception. Overall, Pakistan appears to be playing a multilayered role, seeking to keep both the United States and China satisfied simultaneously, although its current trajectory seems more aligned with Washington.
How has Pakistan managed to maintain its balance in the recent crisis while preserving relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia?
This issue relates to the legal and security dimensions of regional relations. In its interactions with Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently sought to keep tensions under control. Even in cases where actions have been taken against US bases in the region, such measures are not legally interpreted as targeting the territory of host countries, including Saudi Arabia, but rather as actions against US facilities and interests.
This distinction is significant because Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are bound by a defense pact under which an attack on one is considered an attack on the other. The absence of a response from Pakistan, or the lack of a request for one from Saudi Arabia, may indicate an understanding that the actions in question did not constitute a violation of Saudi territorial sovereignty.
Given Pakistan’s energy dependence and the history of projects such as the Peace Pipeline, why has the country not shown serious willingness to cooperate so far? Under current conditions and with Pakistan’s mediating role, can a new approach in Iran-Pakistan relations be expected, or will the situation revert to the status quo after the crisis?
If the Peace Pipeline project were implemented and Iran’s commitment to export approximately 30 million cubic meters of gas per day were fulfilled, a significant portion of Pakistan’s energy shortfall would be addressed. By contrast, alternative methods such as ad hoc LPG imports by truck or LNG shipments by sea are neither comparable in stability nor in economic terms to a long-term, integrated pipeline. Such a pipeline could provide relatively stable energy security for Pakistan for at least two decades.
However, Pakistan has faced two major constraints. First, the inability to finance the project domestically and the failure to attract foreign investment, largely due to prevailing political and economic conditions in the international environment. Second, geopolitical considerations and pressure from certain regional and extra-regional actors, which have led Islamabad to act cautiously—and at times hesitate—in advancing the project.
In practice, Pakistan has sought to maintain a balance between Iran and other players—a strategy that may offer short-term advantages but, in this specific case, has come at the expense of its national interests. Beyond its economic dimension, the project also carries significant geostrategic importance for Pakistan and could strengthen its position as an energy corridor, both in relation to India and within the framework of cooperation with China.
From a broader perspective, Pakistan’s integration into Iran’s transit corridors—including the North-South and East-West routes—could prove mutually beneficial. In this regard, an agreement signed in 2008 established transit on the basis of reciprocity, meaning two-way movement.
Overall, there is optimism that once the current crisis subsides, a new environment may take shape in which Pakistan, with a sharper focus on its national interests, adopts a more active and pragmatic approach toward energy cooperation with Iran.