Hormuz may take ...
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Still, the success of such maneuvering ultimately depends on how far Moscow is prepared to bear the political cost of openly backing such a plan.
What matters here is that Iran appears to have correctly recognized that the core conflict is not simply a war over a maritime passage, but a contest over control of one of the principal nodes in the vital flows of global order. Such a field naturally requires a degree of prior strategic coordination before any new order becomes institutionalized at the international level.
From that angle, making intelligent use of the capacities of powers that share interests with Iran in certain domains is not a luxury option, but a necessity for elevating Tehran’s position in the architecture of a future order.
If the United States does not agree to this proposal, what alternative short-term scenarios could Iran pursue?
First, intensifying tactical control over the Strait of Hormuz in a way that raises the cost of ignoring its proposal, while avoiding direct military confrontation.
Second, strengthening parallel diplomatic tracks with Russia, China and Arab states to demonstrate that Iran’s complete isolation is not feasible.
Third, managing time by preserving the status quo in the nuclear file to prevent a new consensus from forming against it until political conditions in the United States or the region shift.
It could be said that although this phase carries risks of escalation, it still forms part of a “diplomatic timing game,” through which Iran seeks to leverage time itself while increasing its bargaining power.