Copy in clipboard...
Militant groups fuel ...
A temporary ceasefire between the two sides was brokered in October 2025 with the mediation of Qatar and Turkey, but it did not hold. What were the main reasons for its failure?
Well, A mediator must be a country that has potential shared interests with both sides between whom it mediates. Neither Turkey nor Qatar possesses such capacity. They lack serious potential common interests with both parties that could be used as leverage to manage behavior and keep the ceasefire in place. That is the primary reason. Qatar’s role was more functional when Afghanistan was under US occupation. Turkey has economic and at times security-related shared interests with Pakistan, but it does not have extensive ties with Afghanistan.
Moreover, other powers and more substantial actors should at least have participated in the mediation process, such as Iran and India. Had other countries entered the process and a kind of consortium or regional conference been formed for mediation, it might have achieved some success. In its existing form, however, the ceasefire’s instability was evident from the outset.
Some Pakistani officials have accused the Taliban of becoming a tool in India’s hands. How do you assess India’s actual role in this conflict?
The statements made by Pakistani officials are largely propaganda. The claim that Afghanistan has become India’s arm is somewhat far-fetched. However, whether India is dissatisfied with the situation—certainly not. Pakistan being preoccupied with its northern borders is entirely desirable from India’s perspective.
Besides, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has now become a group that provides logistical and training services to Baloch separatist groups inside Pakistan, many of which were effectively shaped by the Indian security system known as RAW. Evidence for this claim lies in the similarities that have emerged between the behavior of separatist groups and the TTP, as well as certain statements made in Afghanistan indicating that connections have been established. From these two perspectives, India is benefiting. However, describing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as a mere instrument of India is an exaggeration and appears largely propagandistic.
Given the escalation of air and ground clashes, is there a risk that this crisis could spill over into a broader regional war?
The clashes are unlikely to widen; neither side seeks an expanded confrontation. Pakistan is facing very low economic growth, which limits its ability to organize heavy military operations once again. At the same time, it faces ongoing concerns along its eastern border with India, whose government has demonstrated a highly pragmatic approach to attacking Pakistan without hesitation. Therefore, Pakistan is not inclined toward broadening the conflict or turning it into a full-scale war.
Iran shares borders and mutual interests with both countries. What measures can it take to prevent being harmed from these clashes?
The most significant step Iran can take is direct and unbiased mediation between the parties. Unfortunately, during previous mediation efforts, Iranian officials adopted positions that effectively pushed the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan into a corner and weakened its negotiating stance. As a result, the Islamic Emirate did not participate in the talks.
It appears that a balanced approach toward both sides is required in order to move forward with a serious dialogue with both countries. Iran has the capacity to do so, both historically and in terms of shared interests, enabling it to engage with both Pakistan and Afghanistan and to broker agreements.