US strike on ...
Page 1
Within this framework, the United States would lean on market psychology, strategic petroleum reserves, and calibrated political messaging to prevent energy prices from turning into a domestic or electoral liability. For Donald Trump, high oil prices are not a tool of deterrence but a political vulnerability at home—effectively placing an unwritten cap on how much tension Washington is willing to absorb.
Should tensions escalate to the point where energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz are seriously disrupted, the picture becomes far more complex. Prices would rise sharply, but the durability of that increase would depend on the US response. The Trump-style approach in such circumstances favors limited shows of force, targeted strikes, and maximum economic pressure over a costly and protracted war—designed to signal resolve without allowing energy markets to spiral out of control.
At the heart of this calculation lies US access to Venezuelan oil, which has raised Washington’s tolerance for temporary disruptions in the Persian Gulf. This does not render the Strait of Hormuz irrelevant. Rather, it reduces its immediate weight in America’s economic calculations. In this context, the strait shifts from being primarily an instrument of economic deterrence to a security variable with broader political implications.
For Iran, this shift is particularly sensitive. Higher oil prices triggered by rising tensions may appear, at first glance, to offer an advantage. Yet if the United States can keep prices within a controlled range—or shift the burden onto Asian consumers, especially China—that advantage is quickly neutralized. Pressure, in this framework, is exerted less through outright conflict and more through economic attrition and the gradual narrowing of options.
Ultimately, the Trump-era approach to the Persian Gulf rests on a core assumption: the United States should be able to generate tension without paying the principal cost. Influence over energy resources outside the Middle East—such as Venezuela—has become a key instrument in making that assumption workable. The result is an environment in which the risk of limited, miscalculated, and high-stakes confrontations increases, while full-scale war remains a costly and unattractive option.
Under these conditions, the central issue for Iran is not forecasting a specific oil price, but recognizing that energy prices have become a political variable—malleable and shaped by great-power rivalry. Any decision regarding the Strait of Hormuz or confrontation with the United States that fails to account for this reality risks serious miscalculation.