Renewed aggression unlikely ...
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Another key issue is whether the United States is currently seeking a new regional confrontation. Iran has stated that if action is taken, its response will not necessarily mirror previous ones and would be more severe, potentially even unpredictable. The prospect of a broader regional war significantly raises the costs of such a move and forces the other side to think twice.
Besides, the US National Security Strategy document published in 2025 did not indicate a desire for deeper US involvement in West Asia. These signals suggest that a renewed attack may not be imminent. Nevertheless, Iran is exercising caution, does not dismiss the possibility, and has maintained and strengthened its defensive readiness since the 12-day war to ensure it can deliver a decisive response if events repeat themselves. Both scenarios, therefore, must be kept in view. The arguments for an imminent new attack are not particularly strong, but no possibility can be entirely discounted.
Based on Shamkhani’s post suggesting that some responses are determined before threats are carried out, can it be inferred that Iran may undertake preemptive action? If so, what would be the regional and international consequences?
This statement does not necessarily imply preemptive action, although it can encompass multiple scenarios and is open to interpretation. One reading is that Iran has already decided on the nature and quality of its response to any act of aggression and has mapped out its operational approach, leaving no doubt that it would retaliate. This reflects Tehran’s resolve to respond to any military action, likely more forcefully than before.
While preventive steps to neutralize threats cannot be ruled out under certain circumstances, the statement should not automatically be read as signaling preemption. So far, Tehran does not appear to be seeking escalation or war. At the same time, it is not fearful of conflict and stands ready to respond. If another war were to erupt, broader and more intense than before, the region would likely become more deeply entangled, and the costs imposed — including on opposing parties — would be heavier than in previous rounds. A prevailing view in Iran is that the cost of any military action against the country must be significantly raised to establish effective deterrence.
What conditions are necessary for negotiations to resume, and how likely is the formation of a new round of talks? How does the introduction of Iran’s missile program alongside the nuclear file affect this process?
The resumption of negotiations depends first on whether the other side adheres to basic principles and procedures of negotiation and genuinely seeks dialogue. Predetermining outcomes or setting conditions in advance amounts not to negotiation but, as Iranian officials have noted, to dictation and imposition. If this approach continues, a meaningful negotiating process is unlikely to take shape, and the status quo will probably persist.
If, however, the other side alters its approach and demonstrates flexibility, a negotiating track might become possible, though reaching results would require additional factors. The United States would need to avoid a one-sided perspective, recognize Iran’s rights, and accept that Iran seeks to benefit from enrichment under international law while also seeing sanctions lifted.
Expanding the scope of talks beyond nuclear issues to non-nuclear matters such as missiles would have negative effects on the process. Such signals suggest reluctance to begin negotiations and only tangle the knot further, deepening Iran’s distrust of the United States and the West.
Ultimately, the most crucial requirement is trust; not mutual trust, but at least confidence in the negotiating process itself. Otherwise, no serious breakthrough should be expected.