Washington-Beijing strategic confrontation
By Abbas Abdolkhani
Researcher on economic affairs
In the 21st century, the concepts of power and wealth, which had previously been defined on the basis of physical, industrial, and military resources, have entered a novel phase. The revolution of artificial intelligence, which has rapidly penetrated the economic, security, and global-governance spheres, has challenged the traditional frameworks of international order. The contest between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in the realm of artificial intelligence is not merely a technological struggle; rather, it constitutes a confrontation over the redefinition of wealth, economic power, and strategic influence in the digital world. This contest, with a concentration upon big data, intelligent algorithms, and computational infrastructures, will transfigure the future of the global economy and the centrality of the industrial policies of states.
The United States, as the cradle of digital innovation, by utilizing the advantage of leading companies and extensive investments in cloud and semiconductor infrastructures, has attempted to consolidate its position in the artificial-intelligence economy. Investments in the domain of artificial intelligence in recent years have increased more than threefold, and a substantial portion of it has been concentrated in research and development, defense domains, energy, health, and education. This orientation, which has been designed upon the basis of smart competition, represents a synthesis of private-sector power and governmental strategic direction, and its objective is technological preeminence over international rivals.
China, however, has adopted a different strategy. The national program “Made in China 2030” and the artificial-intelligence strategy of the State Council of China define artificial intelligence not merely as an instrument of economic growth, but as the principal pillar of the digital-governance order. The combination of state capital, academic research, and immense demographic data has enabled China to create a harmonious network of technological enterprises that can simultaneously advance industrial development and data supervision. Reports from the World Bank indicate that the share of China’s digital economy in its gross domestic product has experienced significant growth in recent years; this phenomenon signifies the transfer of the axis of wealth from heavy industries to the economy of data and artificial intelligence.
The contest between the United States and China in this domain possesses extensive dimensions. The control over the supply chain of semiconductors and advanced chips has transformed into the principal axis of the contest. The restrictions upon the export of advanced American chips to China and China’s attempts to develop indigenous chips and cloud-processing capacities are explicit exemplars of this contest. These measures have not only influenced markets and global value chains but have also accelerated the formation of new technological blocs. Any state or region that lags in this contest will be exposed to the diminution of economic influence and the threat of security vulnerabilities.
Artificial intelligence has rapidly transformed into the principal catalyst of global productivity growth. Estimates indicate that the share of artificial intelligence in the global economy will reach more than $15 trillion by 2030, a substantial portion of which will belong to China and the United States. This phenomenon demonstrates that the future dominance of the global economy depends upon the capacity of states to utilize with efficacy the technologies of deep learning, intelligent decision-support systems, and industrial automation. Companies and venture-capital funds serve as the connective bridge between policy and market and determine the grand geo-economic orientations.
The contest between China and the United States has also engendered the emergence of a new technological balance. If, in the 20th century, nuclear deterrence constituted the guarantor of the stability of powers, in the 21st century, algorithmic superiority and the supervision of big data have become the new criteria of global power and influence. States that lag in this domain will be constrained not only in the economy but also in national security and foreign policy.
In social and governance dimensions, the United States concentrates upon the preservation of individual liberties, privacy, and the ethics of artificial intelligence, whereas China concentrates upon efficiency, social order, and digital security. These two divergent orientations reflect their distinct values and political objectives and have produced two rival models of digital governance in the world.
Artificial intelligence has caused transformations in supply chains, demand forecasting, renewable energies, and financial services. American companies are preeminent in the development of advanced algorithms and analytical models, whereas China possesses superiority in the scalability and commercialization of industrial applications of artificial intelligence. These structural differences have endowed the two states with a combination of software and hardware advantages and have produced a continuous and intricate contest in the global market.
The contest between the United States and China in the domain of artificial intelligence is not merely a technological contest, but it entails a fundamental redefinition of power and wealth in the digital world. This contest, with economic, security, social, and governance dimensions, will influence the future of global order and will transfigure the trajectory of states in confronting the rapid transformations of technology. The United States, with innovation, venture capital, and advanced infrastructures, and China, with industrial scalability and data-centrism, pursue different yet equivalent trajectories, and the future of global power will not be determined by military might, but by domination over data resources and decision-making algorithms.
The article was first published in Persian by Iranian Diplomacy.