Seven fruits of Mohammed bin Salman’s trip to US
By Amin Parto
Expert on Middle Eastern affairs
Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, undertook a remarkably clamorous trip to the United States. What, then, was the yield of this trip for the Middle East? These are the most consequential items that appear evident:
1. Attainment of a defensive and security cooperation with the United States commensurate with that of Qatar: When Qatar, subsequent to the Israeli aerial assault, requested a security guarantee from the United States — whereby an attack against Qatar would be construed as tantamount to an attack upon American interests — Saudi Arabia likewise conceived the notion of presenting an analogous request to the United States. In what respect, precisely, is Saudi Arabia inferior to Qatar? Especially under circumstances in which, unlike Qatar, it has not granted asylum to Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood, has not supported groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (at a time when it was designated terrorist), and does not maintain clandestinely amicable relations with Iran?
2. Agreement concerning rare elements: The United States finds itself under severe pressure from China owing to its dependency on rare mineral elements. China possesses an almost monopolistic dominion over these minerals, which are acutely indispensable for American industries, particularly its military sector. Now, Saudi Arabia, according to certain assessments, may be capable of assisting the United States in the procurement of some of these elements. The Jabal Sayid reserves — containing more than 550,000 tons of heavy elements and 355,000 tons of light elements, potentially constituting the fourth-largest deposit in the world — represent one of Saudi Arabia’s principal hopes for exporting rare raw materials to the United States. During Mohammed bin Salman’s trip, agreements were concluded with the United States to construct joint production facilities with MP Materials Corporation, enabling the commencement of production and processing of these elements. Nevertheless, challenges such as water scarcity in Saudi Arabia and the necessity for foreign specialists to initiate the production process persist.
3. The F-35: By purchasing 48 aircraft, Saudi Arabia shall become the second operator of the F-35 in the Middle East after Israel. This occurs despite the negative response four years earlier to the United Arab Emirates’ request to acquire the aircraft, and despite the continued improbability that Turkey — due to Israel’s opposition — will be able to procure it. The Saudi version of the F-35 will certainly be considerably inferior to the Israeli version in its software and hardware (including radar evasion) and will not constitute a threat to Israel. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia does not harbor hostility toward Israel, and the threats it perceives originate elsewhere. It must, however, be stated that the paramount consequence of Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of the F-35 is a drastic diminution in the likelihood of expanded Chinese arms purchases, particularly concerning long-range air-defense systems or combat aircraft.
4. Other armaments: Saudi Arabia obtained additional procurements, including 300 Abrams tanks of the latest variant, intended to replace the antiquated M-60 tanks and the Abrams tanks it has possessed for two decades. The Saudi Abrams fleet has also endured the protracted Yemeni war. Saudi Arabia will likewise acquire 60 F-15EX aircraft. These fighters are replacements for the Saudi offensive F-15 fleet, which has also endured the prolonged war in Yemen.
5. Refusal to be extorted by Trump regarding the Abraham Accords: Trump exerted considerable insistence that Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords and formally recognize Israel. The Saudi red line, however, was singular: Israel must consent to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in whatever form it may materialize. Yet this very issue is Israel’s red line: Netanyahu explicitly declared that, for Israel, the non-establishment of an independent Palestinian state is far more significant than relations with Saudi Arabia. Israel can wait indefinitely for relations with Saudi Arabia, yet it remains eternally opposed to the formation of an independent Palestinian state. Trump attempted to persuade bin Salman to recede from this position, but the Saudi crown prince did not and refused to retreat, a matter that profoundly displeased Trump. Saudi Arabia’s demand is unambiguous: Israel must consent to a defined and temporally structured path toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state and must record and register its commitment in an international document.
6. Mediation regarding the Iranian issue: Although contradictory statements and extensive denials persist concerning the transmission of a letter from the Iranian president to the United States by bin Salman, it is not implausible to imagine that Saudi Arabia seeks to undertake such a role. While other channels of negotiation and mediation between Iran and the United States (Oman, Qatar, and Iraq) have reached an impasse, a new channel could be Saudi Arabia.
7. Obtaining authorization for acquiring hardware required for the development of artificial intelligence: The United States has granted Saudi Arabia (and likewise the United Arab Emirates) authorization to purchase up to 35,000 Nvidia Blackwell chips for use in artificial intelligence systems. This purchase, of course, constitutes an initial step toward a much grander contract for the acquisition of an additional 600,000 chips required for artificial-intelligence systems.
The article was first published in Persian by the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies.