Iran-Iraq ties ...
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He thought staying out of such a scene would eventually work to his advantage. But that miscalculation may now lead to some frustration within his support base, and signs of that are already visible. His repeated boycott statements, the reprimands of followers who defied him, the expulsion of around 40 members who decided to run, and even his recent sharp-toned message to the representative of the religious authority in Karbala—all coupled with the public’s higher turnout—don’t paint a promising picture for him.
His fervent fans will inevitably expect him to step back into the political fray. Those around him, whose interests depend on direct involvement in parliament and government structures, are likely dissatisfied. In fact, before the vote, some figures in his political camp had urged him to allow indirect participation, but he refused. If Sadr doesn’t rethink his strategy, he could run into serious trouble. The era of sending his supporters to storm parliament as a form of protest is long gone and similar moves in the future won’t serve him well either.
Someone who has quit politics ten times and always returned can do so again. I believe that even if the Sadrists’ absence reduces their active political engagement, their participation could still offer opportunities for constructive involvement within official frameworks. Although the Sadr movement stands in clear opposition to the Coordination Framework—a Shia alliance close to Iran—its presence in parliament and Tehran’s potential outreach to it could, in the end, open the door to some developments acceptable to Iran.
Given parliament’s key role in choosing Iraq’s president and prime minister, what scenarios are most likely for forming the new government? Could forces aligned with the “Axis of Resistance” and close to Iran gain a stronger foothold in the next administration?
It’s a bit difficult to pin down a clear answer right now. Developments in Iraq are fast-moving, with multiple domestic and foreign factors in play, and the precise results for various political forces—including the resistance factions—are not yet known. Once that’s settled, the tough bargaining over cabinet formation and the choice of prime minister will begin.
This time around, it appears the Americans are keen to weigh in more directly on the negotiations and the formation of the next government. The appointment of a special envoy of Iraqi descent by President Trump just days before the elections can hardly be called coincidental. Statements by that envoy, along with remarks from other US officials like Marco Rubio, suggest that Trump wants post-election Iraq—or Iraq after the October 7 Gaza and the ceasefire—to move in a direction aligned with Washington’s preferred order.
Therefore, pressure on the resistance groups and US interference in shaping the new government in ways favorable to Washington and its regional allies should come as no surprise. Even if the resistance-aligned forces perform well electorally, the US will likely push hard to keep them out of the government-formation process and may even take steps to undercut the Shia Coordination Framework.
In any case, if pro-Iran factions manage to gain real power in the new parliament or cabinet—and if the US fails to keep them at bay—we could well see tensions flare up between Washington and Baghdad in the coming period.