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What role have China and Russia played in countering the threats arising from the activation of the snapback mechanism against Iran? Have they increased their security and trade commitments toward Tehran?
The snapback mechanism is a curious development in that it has effectively broken the consensus. Both Russia and China, as permanent Security Council members, have openly declared the move illegal and their support is immensely significant.
Even if that backing were not at legal level, the moral and diplomatic support of Moscow and Beijing has already taken the sting out of the snapback process. Both countries are major trading partners of Iran. By refusing to recognize the mechanism, they reduce its practical impact.
According to a statement by Iran’s Foreign Ministry, more than 100 countries have expressed opposition or legal noncompliance with the mechanism, a stance that would have been impossible without the backing of two permanent Security Council members. Moreover, should any new resolution be proposed under the snapback framework, China and Russia can exercise their veto.
They have also clarified that the UN is not obliged to enforce the measure, which is a major development, particularly with China taking the lead on this stance.
However, it would be simplistic to assume that China, whose long-term interests lie in avoiding major global tensions, would sacrifice its strategic priorities for Iran or even for Russia. Beijing’s overarching goal is to sustain its current economic growth rate around five to six percent and to stay away from direct confrontation with the US. Still, helping Iran avoid another war in the Persian Gulf fits within China’s strategic interests. After all, a large-scale conflict would endanger global energy stability, something Beijing can ill afford.
What steps have China and Russia taken to safeguard Iran’s energy security and trade routes?
The mere fact that China continues to buy Iranian oil shows its unwillingness to bow to US and UN sanctions. It also gives Beijing a bargaining chip in its trade talks with Washington. Just last week, Iranian oil tankers, for the first time in a long while, were sailing toward China with their transmitters switched on.
China’s refusal to recognize the sanctions means that some of its second-tier refineries can continue purchasing Iranian crude, though with discounts. Still, that constitutes a vital form of support.
According to unofficial reports, there has also been military cooperation, though the extent of it remains unclear. Yet such reports have been consistently corroborated by multiple informal sources.
Could the 12-day war pave the way for fundamental changes in the trilateral relationship among Iran, China, and Russia?
It would be overly simplistic to claim that the war could bring about structural changes, particularly in China’s case. However, Beijing views Iran as part of the front resisting US unilateral domination. As the holder of the world’s third-largest oil and gas reserves, Iran plays a critical role in China’s economic contest with Washington.
Russia’s situation is quite different. It is already bogged down in sanctions and, economically and technologically, lags far behind China. Thus, Tehran’s primary economic focus is on Beijing, while its security partnership with Moscow remains strategically important.