Hamas response to ...
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Considering Israel’s record of violating agreements and continuing its occupation, how likely is it that Tel Aviv will break commitments during implementation of this plan?
For now, Israeli officials have largely kept quiet, with only Netanyahu’s office issuing a statement. Yet the language of Israeli media, citing sources, indicates Israel is ready to go along with the first stage. That stage involves halting the war and exchanging prisoners—something both Hamas and Israel want.
Recent reports have suggested a slowdown of attacks, with some Israeli units halting or even pulling back in parts of Gaza. The message is that these steps are meant to prepare the ground for prisoner swaps. But moving to the second phase—negotiating the broader terms—is far more serious.
Here, Palestinians insist that the strongest guarantee against Israel backtracking lies in US hands. They argue that Washington calls the shots, under both [former US president Joe] Biden and Trump. From Hamas’s perspective, the fact that the war was not stopped under Biden was due to America’s lack of sincerity. The view is that if Trump wants the war to stop, it will stop. For this reason, Hamas intends to rope Trump in as a guarantor. Given Trump’s influence and his personal characteristics, such involvement could indeed make it harder for Israel to slide back into conflict.
But there is also the risk of a repeat of past experience: the first stage of a ceasefire being implemented, only for talks to stall before reaching the second phase.
One clause in Trump’s plan calls for removing Hamas from Gaza’s future governance. Is Hamas ready to step aside from executive power? And if so, what would its political future look like?
Hamas’s stance—both before and after October 7—has consistently been that it is willing to hand over governance to a national unity government or one formed through national dialogue. This has been a longstanding position and was reiterated again in its recent statement. But Hamas added one condition: that this decision must stem from Palestinian consensus.
During the “Al-Aqsa Flood” period, intra-Palestinian dialogue was held in Cairo and even in Beijing, with all factions participating. Hamas had no objection to the Palestinian Authority taking charge of Gaza’s administration. Israel, however, rejects this because any Palestinian government in Gaza still means Hamas remains alive as a political and security actor.
The major challenge after the war is reconstruction. Hamas understands that rebuilding Gaza will require a different government, and it does not oppose the idea —it has accepted such arrangements in previous talks and initiatives. The sticking point remains Israel’s search for its favored alternative capable of running Gaza.
So far, Israel has tried to break Gaza down neighborhood by neighborhood, tapping into the role of clans, which are highly influential in Palestinian society. Each clan often dominates a particular district. Recent clashes between Hamas and a clan in Khan Younis, illustrate this struggle. Israel has attempted to empower certain clans by giving them local authority, but Hamas, aware of the implications, has moved swiftly to eliminate rivalries.