UNGA chance for ...
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Despite such limits, experience has shown that even at the height of tension, limited-scope, temporary, issue-specific agreements remain possible. Iran is clearly seeking to tap into this path, while making sure its willingness for such engagement is not taken advantage of by Western capitals.
Does Iran have any legal or political instruments at its disposal to halt or at least soften this trajectory?
Legally, Iran can resort to dispute-settlement mechanisms within international bodies, including filing a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice over US and European violations of their commitments and making use of statutory mechanisms at the IAEA to formally register objections against breaches of agreements. While these measures may not yield immediate tangible results, they achieve three critical goals:
Officially documenting Western breaches in international records; raising political and reputational costs for violators within the international system; and creating a legal basis for demanding compensation for Iran’s economic and human losses.
Politically, several levers remain at Tehran’s disposal: suspending or redefining its level of cooperation with the IAEA to enhance bargaining power; leveraging regional partnerships, particularly with Russia, China, and neighboring states, to deepen political, security, and economic ties; and tracking and capitalizing on emerging regional and international processes as bargaining chips when the timing is right.
In light of recent Western positions, what reaction should be expected toward Iran’s diplomatic efforts? Could scenarios such as invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter be on the table?
The most likely scenario is a continuation of the current situation, coupled with political pressure and the possible activation of snapback or even referral [of Iran’s nuclear dossier] to the Security Council. Although implementing such a course would be costly for all parties, given its security implications and Tehran’s potential response, the West continues to keep this option as a stick on the table. Therefore, the possibility of a gradual return to diplomacy cannot be completely written off. Shifts on the ground or changes in political calculations may yet open new windows for talks.
Could regional states such as Qatar or Oman play a role in mediating or facilitating dialogue? And would Iran be willing to rely on these regional capacities?
Countries like Qatar and Oman have effectively become official channels between Iran and the West. They have already mediated in sensitive matters such as prisoner exchanges and the release of Iranian frozen funds. Thanks to their relative neutrality and balanced relations with Washington, Tehran, and Europe, these states have significant potential to facilitate dialogue.
Iran has already shown practical willingness to make use of these channels—as seen in the recent talks mediated by Oman. But these capacities, too, have been partly constrained. Of particular note is the Israeli strike on Doha carried out with US backing, which has also dented Qatar’s and Oman’s trust in Washington. This development could weaken, or at least redirect, their mediating role moving forward.