Iran should use ...
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For this reason, it would be a mistake to assume the snapback has no impact. The political consequence would be more severe. Iran would be branded as a violator of international law under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under the JCPOA framework, enrichment had been legitimized and even capped at 3.67%. But with the return of Resolution 1929, Iran would be required to halt enrichment altogether.
Another outcome would be the difficulty of lifting sanctions again. One of the JCPOA’s most significant achievements was the cancellation, on its very first day of implementation, of six Security Council resolutions against Iran. Yet once the snapback is triggered, those resolutions will be revived, placing Iran once more under Chapter VII. To exit that situation a second time, Tehran might be compelled to grant greater concessions.
This is why Iran should not to allow the snapback to take effect. Preserving the JCPOA, even in a limited form, can still prevent sanctions from returning. If confidence-building is required, Iran could temporarily agree—whether for a few months or even several years—to certain restrictions on enrichment. This would not only help break through the current political deadlock but also allow Tehran to rebuild damaged facilities and thereby restore enrichment capacity in practice.