Israel has failed anyway
Regardless of Israel’s brutal response, Hamas and resistance will emerge victorious
The Operation Al-Aqsa Storm, given the scale of casualties and the surprise for the Zionists, is of the utmost strategic significance. This sudden attack not only exposed a resounding defeat but subsequently inflicted unprecedented human casualties on various elements of Israel’s military and security apparatus. These casualties were more than twice the number of Israeli casualties in the 1967 war, most of which occurred on the first day of the operation. The security and military failures of October 7 far exceed Israel’s losses in the October 1973 war (often referred to as the Yom Kippur War); hence, given the scale of casualties and the humiliating defeat of this regime, it cannot be compensated by the smallest member of the resistance’s response to Israel.
Whatever the outcome of the Gaza war, it will have significant consequences for Israel’s regime and society. These events not only lead to debates about who is responsible for this unprecedented failure but also undermine the confidence of the Israeli people in the army and the security system’s ability to protect them.
As a result, the first blow was to the regime’s Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) and the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet), which could not predict or even obtain information about this operation. Moreover, in a regime that has built its global reputation on boasting about its security power and its technological and intelligence capabilities, the attack has inflicted an irreparable blow to Israel’s security information system.
The second major failure is the wall that Israel has built around Gaza. Since its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel has constructed a fortified concrete wall around Gaza, approximately 65 kilometers in length, 7 meters deep, and 7 meters high. This wall is equipped with advanced sensors and is monitored by surveillance towers along its perimeter. Israelis easily believed that this wall would be sufficient to prevent Palestinian fighters from infiltrating the occupied territories, but a significant number of fighters managed to cross it and reach more than 20 points in the depths of the occupied lands.
The third failure was the Israeli army’s inability to secure its military base near the northern border of the Gaza Strip and the presence of multiple military points and observation towers along the border, as well as the army’s inability to protect over 20 settlements surrounding Gaza. Hamas military units managed to take over this base and defeat the Israeli forces stationed there.
The fourth failure was the security provision for a music festival hosting several thousand Israeli and foreign guests. This event was held in an open field a few kilometers from the Gaza border, near a military base, and the organizers were obligated to obtain security clearances. Moreover, this operation left the Israeli military establishment in a state of shock, unable to make decisions or respond to the security and military situation.
This sudden attack, with its audacious performance, organizational capabilities, and military experience of Palestinian fighters, paralyzed Israel’s military and political leadership. The Israeli army had long boasted of its readiness to face any challenge and its ability to mobilize for quick response to any attack within hours. However, it not only failed to protect its military bases but also in rapidly regaining control of areas and military settlements.
The magnitude of the consequences after this round of conflict is different from the previous ones. The current conflict has dealt a timely blow to the position of the Israeli cabinet, both domestically and internationally. Compared to previous episodes, Israel’s many shortcomings in its perspectives and security strategies, as well as its assessments of its adversaries’ capabilities, have become apparent. This attack also places Israel in the face of a new stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict and assures the people that Israel’s power boasts are nothing more than a big lie. Therefore, these issues force Israel to change its mindset and reconsider its calculations, which should include topics like the Palestinian government, urbanization, refugees, and Al-Quds; these discussions, in addition to exacerbating challenges internally and impacting Israel’s normalization with the outside world, are significant.
After learning about the scale of Hamas’s military operation, Netanyahu, following consultations with military commanders and members of the security cabinet, declared that Israel was now in a state of war and called for an end to the social divide in Israel.
Israel intends to inflict significant damage on the Palestinians in Gaza and actively seeks to carry out further massacres. This may alter the tone of the conflict for the major world powers that currently exhibit strong support for Israel. Israel attempts to displace the people through intense aerial bombardments and drive them against the leadership.
On the other hand, it must be noted that the resistance forces have achieved unprecedented gains and breakthroughs. Al-Qassam Brigades not only succeeded in breaching Israel’s front line of defense but also pushed the battle deep into Israeli territory and even questioned the principle of Israel’s invincibility. This has reached a point where Israeli authors describe Operation Al-Aqsa Storm as a shock and nightmare that terrified the entire regime and emphasize that this operation was a repetition of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when Egypt liberated the Sinai Peninsula on October 7, 1973.
The consensus in Israel is that, unlike previous wars that began in Gaza, this time the Israeli army must aim to put an end to Hamas rule in Gaza. Nevertheless, this requires at least to some extent the occupation of Gaza, because no matter how many facilities and buildings Israel destroys and no matter how many massacres it commits, it cannot manage the war from the air. If Israel continues with a ground invasion, it will incur heavy casualties in urban warfare against Hamas, which excels in this type of combat.
It appears that in recent years, Israel has replaced its ground forces’ development with investments in its air force, cyber capabilities, and information technologies. Therefore, it can be said that if the war concludes without ending the Hamas rule, Israel’s leadership will add another catastrophic failure to its current list.