Ex-envoy to OPEC:
Iran won’t give up rights to Arash gas field
By Ebrahim Beheshti
Staff writer
In a contentious development, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have jointly announced that Iran holds no claim to the Arash gas field, also known as “Al-Durra”. The discovery of the gas field dates back to the 1960s, but it has remained untapped due to several factors, including disputes between Iran and Kuwait concerning the delimitation of their maritime boundaries.
Iran’s Oil Minister, Javad Owji, responded to the stance taken by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, expressing his concern over their lack of cooperation and understanding. He warned that if there is no willingness to engage in dialogue and cooperation, Iran would assert its rights to the resources, both in terms of benefits and exploitation, and would not tolerate any violation of those rights.
To gain deeper insights into the ongoing disputes and explore potential solutions that could benefit all three countries, Iran Daily conducted an interview with Mohammad-Ali Khatibi, Iran’s former representative in OPEC. The interview aimed to shed light on ways to resolve the tensions surrounding the gas field and enable the three nations to mutually tap into its resources.
Iran Daily: Could you provide insight into the primary contention that arose between Iran and Kuwait pertaining to the Arash gas field?
Khatibi: The central issue, which stretches back over a considerable period, revolves around the absence of clearly defined maritime boundaries between the two nations. The matter at hand is essentially a disagreement over these maritime borders. Consequently, until a consensus on these borders is reached, both sides are left with room for conjecture. The primary objective lies in definitively establishing these maritime boundaries. Subsequent to this crucial step, the focus will shift toward the exploitation and investment in the oil and gas reserves within the shared Arash gas field. This endeavor cannot thrive amidst an environment marked by tensions and threats; instead, it necessitates resolution through negotiations.
Nonetheless, borders did exist between the two countries. The Kuwaitis, however, assert new borders based on seismic findings by oil major Shell, a study that denies Iran’s entitlement to the Arash field. Iran contests this delineation of borders.
Indeed, the chronicle of Iran-Kuwait disputes traces its origins back to the discovery of the gas field in 1960s. What remains of paramount importance is bringing these disagreements to a close and finding a resolution. As such, neither party should proceed to exploit the resources inherent to the shared field until these disputes are satisfactorily addressed and the delineation of borders is established. Engaging in unilateral actions only serves to incite reactions from the opposing side, potentially intensifying the existing conflicts.
The Kuwaiti authorities have consistently engaged in negotiations with Iranian representatives and have never explicitly denied Iran’s stake in the Arash gas field. Even in 2022, Kuwait’s foreign minister declared that Arash constitutes a tripartite gas field shared among Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. What prompted this sudden shift to deny Iran’s participation?
Kuwait’s surprising shift in stance has raised eyebrows, particularly considering the ongoing push for reduced tensions and peaceful coexistence in the regional political landscape. Attempting to forge agreements with other nations or international corporations for the exploitation of Arash’s resources without Iran’s concurrence would prove futile, given Iran’s non-acceptance of such endeavors. Notably, Iran is the sole party that Kuwait deals with in this case. While the delineation of maritime boundaries carries inherent complexities, it is conceivable that this has contributed to the prolonged negotiations without yielding a definitive outcome.
Nonetheless, my proposed resolution calls for a heightened commitment to negotiations characterized by increased gravity. Perhaps prior to this juncture, when the resource potential of the Arash field wasn’t as crucial, the urgency for cooperation was diminished. Presently, however, all three nations find themselves in need of the oil and gas reserves within this field. Consequently, in the interest of safeguarding their respective rights, a more earnest approach to negotiations becomes imperative.
Could the Kuwaiti and Saudi governments be under the impression that Iran, due to external pressure from Western nations, is in a vulnerable position? Might they be attempting to ramp up pressure or legal maneuvers to compel Iran to yield?
The notion is fundamentally flawed. True weakness manifests when a nation unilaterally gives concessions to superior powers. While Iran may engage in negotiations and make calculated concessions to secure its interests and achieve larger gains – as evidenced in the context of the nuclear deal – it has never capitulated unilaterally to any party. Tehran’s steadfastness in safeguarding its principles and interests against formidable players like Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Europe has remained resolute. The Kuwaiti authorities themselves are aware of Iran’s unwavering commitment to its national interests and understand that Tehran does not waver from its position.
In the event that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia unilaterally tap into the resources of the gas field, while no agreement is reached with Iran, does Iran possess the technical capacity to reciprocally exploit the shared resources within the field?
Indeed, Iran possesses the requisite capability to undertake such efforts. Despite facing sanctions, Iran successfully operationalized the most challenging phase of its South Pars gas field, utilizing entirely domestic technical expertise and even surpassing projected timelines. Iranian corporations have even been actively engaged in substantial projects abroad. It stands to reason that if Kuwait and Saudi Arabia choose to capitalize on the resources of the Arash field, Iran holds the legitimate right to take countermeasures. However, it’s important to emphasize that Iran’s preferred stance is rooted in pursuing negotiations to settle disputes.
You previously advocated for the involvement of an impartial entity to develop the gas field, requiring consensus from all three nations for equitable resource allocation. Do you believe this proposal remains viable prior to the resolution of maritime boundaries?
No, my proposition pertains to the phase of demarcating maritime boundaries. Typically, in the case of shared fields, two methods of exploitation exist: each country independently invests in and develops its respective sector, or, to bring down costs, the nations opt to collaborate through a single entity responsible for field development, subsequently distributing the yielded resources in accordance with prior agreements.
Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have yet to reach this stage, as they must promptly resolve the maritime border dispute before advancing to the exploitation phase. The paramount consideration for all three nations is that operating within an ambiguous and tense environment is in no one’s interests. We expect Kuwaiti officials to continue to exhibit wise policies, as in the past, recognizing that failing to address this dispute could not only deprive each country of economic gains but also potentially strain their diplomatic relations.