Naval blockade of ...
Page 1
How did the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the imposition of a form of naval blockade by the United States affect China’s interests and relations?
In this regard, China’s defense minister stated that Chinese vessels would continue to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and that the United States had no right to obstruct the implementation of China’s energy contracts with Iran. During the blockade, some Chinese supertankers entered Iranian waters, loaded cargo, and then moved out toward their destinations via routes close to Iranian waters, such as near Jask and Chabahar.
It appears that part of this passage occurred either with a degree of US acquiescence or due to Chinese warnings, or alternatively because routes were selected to remain within safer zones. At the same time, some reports indicated that certain Iranian vessels were seized or turned back.
Under conditions of naval blockade, what alternative routes does Iran have to maintain exchanges with China?
One of the most important alternatives is the overland route. Even before the war—and afterward—a railway line has operated from Shanghai, passing through Xinjiang and Turkmenistan into Iran, eventually reaching the Aprin dry port west of Tehran. This route is mainly used for non-oil goods, although the transport of oil products is also possible, but in smaller volumes compared to maritime shipping.
The advantage of this route is its shorter transit time—around 12 to 15 days—compared to 40 to 50 days by sea. It could develop into a transit and even energy hub.
How can the petro-yuan project and its potential replacement of the petrodollar in China’s Persian Gulf oil transactions play a role in relation to the war and Iran?
China’s main objective is the internationalization of the yuan and reducing dependence on the dollar. This is part of broader economic competition between China and the United States and is not necessarily limited to Iran or wartime conditions in the region. China is seeking to advance this policy with various countries, particularly in the Persian Gulf.
However, due to these countries’ close ties with the United States, China proceeds cautiously. In Iran’s case as well, because of sanctions and the high risks associated with economic engagement, China seeks to keep its level of interaction with Iran managed and maintains a conservative approach.
How could increased alignment between China and Iran possibly happen under these conditions?
China already demonstrates a degree of alignment, even if not publicly acknowledged. Iran could leverage the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining tool—meaning that in exchange for reopening or facilitating passage, it could call on China to play a role in pressuring the United States to ease sanctions and release blocked assets.
Additionally, mediation through countries such as Pakistan—which maintains relations with China, the United States, and Arab states—could serve as an important diplomatic channel.
Ultimately, could the continuation of the naval blockade draw China into a more serious confrontation with the United States?
In practice, yes. However, China does not want to enter into direct confrontation with the United States, yet it will not back down from its interests either. The relatively smooth passage of some Chinese tankers through the region suggests that China opposes a full-scale restriction and is seeking to preserve its own energy supply routes.
In reality, the naval blockade is primarily directed at Iran, while other countries continue to enjoy greater freedom. Nonetheless, China is using its influence to work around or reduce these constraints, as Iran remains one of its key partners in oil supply.