US Naval blockade of Iran risky, hard to execute
A war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran led, after forty days, to a temporary ceasefire, with both sides opting to test their chances by kicking off a new round of negotiations. The first round, however, yielded no results and left Washington—already under global pressure due to disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—seeking to step up the pressure by imposing a naval blockade on Iranian ports in a bid to force the Islamic Republic to accept its terms. Abed Akbari, an international affairs expert, argues that such a move is both highly risky and not particularly feasible for the United States, while Iran has a range of tools at its disposal to push back against this pressure. The full transcript of Iran Daily’s interview with the expert follows.
IRAN DAILY: How feasible is a US naval blockade of Iran, and what are the main practical, military, and legal obstacles it would face?
AKBARI: A US naval blockade of Iran is fraught with such operational and legal complexity and cost that the likelihood of its full implementation is very low. Under international law, a naval blockade is considered an act of war and can only be justified within the framework of an armed conflict and with a formal declaration of war. Therefore, enforcing such a measure without approval from the UN Security Council would place the United States in the position of undertaking unilateral action in violation of the UN Charter.
From an operational standpoint, fully controlling the entry and exit points of the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and Iran’s multiple trade routes would require even a country like the United States to maintain a constant deployment of naval strike groups, establish inspection lines, and potentially face off with Iranian naval forces. Given the high density of commercial traffic in the region, such a move would increase the risk of miscalculation and unintended confrontation, making it difficult to control.
Militarily, Iran possesses significant capabilities, including coastal anti-ship missiles, drones, fast attack craft, naval mines, and an integrated defense network, all of which could create a high-risk combat environment for US forces—one that would require Washington to take on substantial political, human, and economic costs. Taken together, these factors make a naval blockade of Iran—both in terms of cost and regional consequences—an option that is not easily executable and high-risk.
What practical, military, and diplomatic measures could Iran take in response to such a move?
Iran’s response to such a scenario could simultaneously play out across operational, military, and diplomatic domains. On the operational front, Iran would likely ramp up alternative land and rail trade routes through Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Central Asian countries, shifting part of its maritime trade onto overland corridors.
In the military sphere, Iran could demonstrate its deterrence capability through a more visible and expanded presence in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. By conducting naval exercises or establishing secure transit patterns for its commercial vessels, it could signal to the opposing side that it has the capacity to bypass or counter restrictions.
Diplomatically, Iran could seek to build up regional and extra-regional consensus against US actions—particularly among countries dependent on Persian Gulf energy, Asian oil importers, and powers such as China and Russia that oppose unilateral measures. In parallel, recourse to international legal mechanisms, filing complaints at the UN Security Council, and drawing on political support from countries for whom any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz carries significant costs are all tools Tehran could employ to neutralize the pressure.
This balanced combination of measures would likely reduce the practical impact of any blockade while driving up the cost of sustaining it for the United States.
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