China’s chances of ...
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Important transport and connectivity networks have existed for decades, both during the Soviet era and since its collapse in 1991. They have gradually been developed and strengthened within the framework of reviving the Iranian Silk Road, the North-South Corridor and the ECO Southern Corridor. Iran’s railway network connects a vast geographical area, stretching from the borders with Turkey, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to Afghanistan, and extending southward to the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that the US naval blockade has also prompted Iran to expand its economic diplomacy, develop transport infrastructure, strengthen its northern ports and streamline customs procedures. Nevertheless, infrastructure limitations, transport costs and sanctions have restricted the extent to which northern routes can fully replace southern ones.
On the other hand, these countries need diverse and reliable routes to access global markets, and Iran can offer them a suitable gateway to open waters. However, regional insecurity and concerns over sanctions may push them toward alternative routes, such as the Middle Corridor. These developments therefore present Iran with a strategic opportunity, but capitalizing on it depends on ensuring transit security, reducing costs, maintaining regulatory stability and building mutual trust. Lasting cooperation can only take shape when the economic and security interests of all parties are served.
However, the pressure exerted by the US on these governments should not be overlooked. Regional governments face considerable constraints. All of them maintain extensive relations with the US and Western countries, as well as with Israel. Their official policy is generally to maintain relations with all sides, from Russia and China to Iran and Turkey, as well as Western countries. Nevertheless, their vulnerability to US pressure can sometimes constitute a major constraint.
Overall, shared opposition to US unilateralism does not necessarily translate into a political alliance or unrestricted economic cooperation. To capitalize on the potential of Russia and Central Asia, Iran needs to focus on shared interests, long-term projects, trade facilitation and the creation of mutual economic interdependence, while also remaining aware of the practical limitations of such an approach. This is because the way states operate in the international system is always more complicated than the agreements they reach or the statements their officials make.
Given the competition between Russia, China, Turkey and other regional players in Central Asia and the Caucasus, what opportunities and constraints does Iran face in seeking to strengthen its position in the region?
Since the Central Asian and Caucasus countries gained independence, extensive competition has emerged among regional and global powers across Eurasia. This rivalry, particularly between the West and Russia, has been a greater source of tensions, crises and wars than competition involving other powers. The war in Georgia during the first decade of the 21st century, followed by the war in Ukraine, has been a consequence of the West’s expansionist policies in the region, to which Russia has responded by pushing back against what it considers a threat to its security interests.
From the outset, the Islamic Republic of Iran has also been sensitive to Western presence and influence along its 3,000-kilometer northern borders and has sought to coordinate with Russia and regional countries in responding to these moves.
In any case, Central Eurasia holds considerable importance in Iran’s foreign policy because of its geopolitical position and the competition among regional and global powers. The presence of Russia, China, Turkey and the US in these areas creates both opportunities for expanding cooperation and constraints on Iran’s efforts to increase its influence.
Iran’s most significant advantage is its geographical position and transit potential. Through the development of the North-South Corridor, expansion of railway links, energy cooperation and the facilitation of trade, Iran has sought to connect Central Asian countries to the Persian Gulf and global markets. Historical and cultural ties with countries in the region, along with their need for diverse trade routes, have also created favorable conditions for expanding economic relations.
Nevertheless, Iran faces significant constraints. US sanctions, banking difficulties, a shortage of foreign investment and weaknesses in some transport infrastructure undermine the country’s economic competitiveness. By contrast, China has extensive financial resources and economic capacity, Russia has historical and security ties in the region, and Turkey has strong trade relations and access to European markets, giving them effective tools to expand their influence.
Of course, competition among these powers does not necessarily mean that Iran will be sidelined. In some cases, it can also create opportunities for multilateral cooperation and strengthen Tehran’s bargaining position.
In my view, the two main factors that have constrained Iran’s Eurasian strategy are, first and foremost, US and Western sanctions pressure and, secondly, the weakness of Iran’s private sector. Throughout these years, both factors have played a significant role in limiting Iran’s economic initiatives in the region and undermining its position in regional economic relations. At present, China, Russia and Turkey are the region’s main economic partners, followed by some European countries, while Iran plays a more limited role.
Could current developments lead to stronger regional cooperation and the emergence of more sustainable economic arrangements between Iran and its northern neighbors, or will conflicting interests and the political considerations of these countries stand in the way of such a prospect?
The war against Iran and the blockade have made the importance of, and opportunities for, regional cooperation across Eurasia more apparent to our country. Naturally, the naval blockade of Iran’s ports has heightened the strategic importance of cooperation with northern countries and Asian partners. As a result, developing land-based and regional routes has become an economic and geopolitical necessity.
Under these circumstances, Iran’s membership in organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides platforms that can help reduce the country’s economic vulnerability. BRICS offers opportunities for discussions on settling transactions in national currencies, banking cooperation and expanding trade relations. The SCO, meanwhile, can help strengthen Iran’s ties with Russia, China and Central Asia, particularly in transport, energy and overland trade.
Nevertheless, we must be fully aware that membership in these organizations does not, in itself, mean the lifting of sanctions or guarantee economic and military support from their members. Russia and China have strategic considerations regarding the expansion of US influence across Eurasia and may view closer cooperation with Iran as a means of maintaining the regional balance of power. However, their interests do not fully coincide with those of Tehran. China depends on energy security and uninterrupted maritime shipping, while Russia has its own independent security and economic priorities. Therefore, expecting unlimited support from these countries would be unrealistic.
Ultimately, the current crisis can strengthen regional cooperation, provided that Iran makes use of its shipping and transport capacities in the Caspian Sea, the North-South Corridor, its railway network and trade agreements to diversify its trade routes. The sustainability of this process depends on joint investment, workable financial mechanisms and the management of differences, rather than merely on shared concerns over US influence.