Enemies been warned, Armed Forces been mandated
Commander-in-chief settles battlefield-politics debate: Expert
The recent meeting between senior commanders of Iran’s Armed Forces and Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, the Commander-in-Chief and Leader of the Islamic Revolution, took place amid fast-changing regional military and security developments and the experience of recent wars, which have ushered the Islamic Republic’s calculations regarding deterrence and defense into a new phase. The Leader’s emphasis on prudent combat readiness, an immediate and effective response to every level and type of threat without geographical restrictions, and the updating of the target database to encompass the tangible and intangible assets of the US and the Zionist regime constituted some of the most important themes of the meeting. The Commander-in-Chief also stated explicitly that, should the enemies resume military or terrorist attacks, it would be Iran’s Armed Forces and the Iranian nation that determine the time and conditions for their termination. This position, alongside the emphasis on strengthening indigenous defense doctrines and tactics, may indicate the consolidation of a new approach in the country’s military strategy. In this context, Shadab Asgari, a military affairs analyst, told Iran Daily in the following exclusive interview that this message had two important dimensions: first, issuing a final warning to hostile powers and emphasizing that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s warnings are operationally actionable; and second, consolidating Iran’s new position in regional security calculations and beyond. The full interview follows:
By Sadeq Dehqan
Staff writer
IRAN DAILY: What significance does the recent meeting between senior commanders of Iran’s Armed Forces and the Commander-in-Chief, and the message released following it, hold at the present juncture? The message appears to contain points that differ from previous positions.
ASGARI: The message released following the meeting between Iran’s Commander-in-Chief Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei and senior Armed Forces commanders, in my view, had two extremely important dimensions. The first was issuing a final warning to the hegemonic powers and Western powers. During the 12-Day War and the Ramadan War, they came to understand that when the Islamic Republic of Iran announces a position, it remains committed to it and possesses the capability to operationalize it as well.
For example, when the martyred Leader stated that this would be a regional war, we witnessed in practice that, only two hours after the war began, its scope expanded to the regional level. Therefore, the Islamic Republic’s statements and warnings cannot be regarded as political positions and propaganda. The enemies know that they must take every single word and position expressed by Iran into account.
In my view, a significant part of the Commander-in-Chief’s recent message conveys precisely this meaning: if the enemies undertake military or terrorist action, they must expect the consequences. This message is, in effect, a final warning.
The message emphasizes an immediate response to threats without geographical restrictions. How does this differ from Iran’s previous approach?
In the past, the Islamic Republic of Iran took certain considerations into account in its military responses. For example, the primary focus was on the enemy’s military bases and installations, while Iran largely refrained from targeting economic assets and infrastructure serving public welfare and services.
However, these considerations now appear to be changing. When a facility or infrastructure is used by the enemy to support military operations, it can no longer be regarded merely as a civilian installation outside the parameters of conflict. In fact, the Commander-in-Chief has made it clear through this message that the scope of Iran’s response will not be confined exclusively to military targets and that any asset or capability serving as an instrument of threats against Iran may be incorporated into deterrence calculations.
What has prompted Iran to extend the geographical scope of its response beyond the region? Does this mean an expansion of the conflict to encompass more countries?
We must take into account the realities of recent wars. Neither during the 12-Day War nor during the Ramadan War were we confronting only the United States and the Zionist regime. Other countries also participated in these operations, either directly or indirectly.
For instance, American aircraft flying from various bases toward the operational theater required aerial refueling. Tanker aircraft took off from countries such as Bulgaria and refueled them along their routes. Had such cooperation not existed, some of these operations would not have been feasible.
Countries such as Britain, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy also played various roles in supporting these operations. Even the presence of military personnel from certain European countries and their participation in logistical support and the transportation of equipment and wounded personnel demonstrated the broader dimensions of this cooperation.
Therefore, when a country participates in facilitating the preparations for an attack against Iran, its role cannot be disregarded. Of course, this does not mean that every country hosting an American military base will necessarily become an Iranian target. For example, Turkey or Pakistan may host an American military presence, but this alone does not signify their participation in operations against Iran. The principal criterion is the nature of the cooperation and the role each country plays in threatening the Islamic Republic of Iran.
But does extending the scope of the response to these countries not increase the risk of Iran confronting several fronts simultaneously? Is such an approach manageable from a military and strategic standpoint?
In my view, we must distinguish between direct military confrontation with a country and the endangerment of that country’s interests. When Iran speaks of responding to those participating in aggression, this does not necessarily imply entering into a conventional, direct war with all of them.
Sometimes, a limited action can impose extremely substantial economic and security costs on a country. For example, suppose a missile strikes a prominent building in a regional country. Only one building may appear to have sustained damage, but the repercussions for investment, tourism, and economic confidence could be extensive.
Following such an incident, would investors still visit that country with the same degree of confidence? Would tourists still regard it as a safe recreational destination? Thus, a limited action can sometimes inflict extremely substantial economic and reputational damage.
Consequently, threatening the interests of countries participating in aggression does not necessarily mean directly attacking their territory. Rather, it may also entail disrupting their economic, commercial, and security interests. This, in itself, can serve as a deterrent and discourage countries with limited involvement in operations from continuing their cooperation with the United States.
The Leader’s recent statement emphasized the inclusion of all types of the enemy’s tangible and intangible assets in the target database. What significance does this hold, given Iran’s changing approach toward infrastructure?
Western countries, and the United States in particular, generally design their wars around several principal tenets. First, the war must be as short and swift as possible. Second, primary reliance is placed on air power and missiles. Third, by inflicting devastating strikes, they seek to create conditions in which, even if the target country’s military is not entirely destroyed, its population is subjected to pressure and desperation and ultimately compelled to accede to the aggressor’s demands.
To achieve the third objective, they target the country’s essential infrastructure. In other words, they seek to intensify pressure on the population by damaging economic, service-related, and vital structures.
However, compared with many regional countries, Iran possesses a different degree of strategic depth and a distinct range of capabilities. For example, small countries such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait are not comparable to Iran in terms of territorial expanse and strategic depth.
During the recent war, reports also emerged that certain regional countries had proposed temporarily shutting down specific facilities and even paying Iran compensation, provided that Iran refrained from attacking those installations.
In my view, the changes observed in the trajectory of Iran’s attacks against certain countries may be associated with such considerations. For example, at certain junctures, attacks against some countries continued, whereas those against others diminished or ceased. If these reports are accurate, they indicate that the opposing side has concluded that the security of its vital infrastructure depends on its own conduct and decisions.
This issue is also important from another perspective: when a country proposes shutting down its facilities to avoid being attacked, it is effectively acknowledging its own strategic vulnerability.
The Commander-in-Chief’s statement emphasizes the transformation and deepening of Iran’s defense doctrine and the enhancement of military capabilities. Can this be regarded as an indication that the country is moving beyond a purely defensive strategy toward active deterrence and an offensive approach?
Yes. One of the first statements made by Martyr Abdolrahim Mousavi, the then-Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, following his appointment, was that the country’s military doctrine and strategy had changed. This transformation was consolidated during the tenure of the martyred Leader, but not all its dimensions had been implemented before then.
We have now reached a stage of capability and operational conditions in which the full implementation of this strategy has become feasible. This means that we will no longer simply wait for the enemy to attack before responding.
For example, if indications emerge that an operation against Iran is being prepared, the possibility must exist for the Armed Forces to act preemptively to neutralize the threat before an attack occurs. If tanker aircraft are stationed in a particular country and this deployment constitutes an indication that an operation against Iran is being prepared, why should we wait for the attack to take place before responding?
This is precisely the transformation that has taken place in the country’s military doctrine: a shift from an exclusively reactive approach toward active deterrence and confronting threats before they materialize into an operational attack.
Overall, what mandate does the Commander-in-Chief’s recent message establish for the Armed Forces, political officials, and hostile countries?
If I were to summarize the entirety of the Commander-in-Chief’s statements in a single sentence, to the extent of my own knowledge and understanding, I would say that he has clarified all possible courses of action and ambiguities and determined the responsibilities of all parties.
This message has clarified the mandate not only for the Armed Forces but also for political officials and hostile countries. The enemies must understand that they can no longer enter the arena with their previous calculations and expect Iran to respond solely within a restricted and predictable framework.
Another point that must be considered is the position of the Leader as an elected representative of the people and an articulator of the public will. In my view, through this message, he expressed some of the people’s demands and aspirations that had been voiced during public gatherings and nightly demonstrations.