ECONOMIC LENS
Is global economy moving beyond Washington’s dominance?
By Mohammadreza Hosseini Aliabad
Researcher in int'l economics
For decades, the global economy rested on an almost unquestioned reality: few major economic decisions could be made without taking Washington into account. From financial markets and international trade to global payment systems and monetary policy, the United States was not merely a leading player; it helped set the rules of the game. Yet a question is now gaining urgency in economic and political circles: Is the world preparing for an economic order in which the US is no longer its undisputed center of gravity?
The answer lies not in the imminent collapse of American economic power, but in a gradual redistribution of influence. What is unfolding today is less the disintegration of the US-led economic order than the erosion of Washington’s near-monopoly over the rules governing it. Emerging powers are increasingly reluctant to tie their economic security and commercial future to decisions made in the White House or at the Federal Reserve.
China stands at the heart of this transformation. Over the past two decades, Beijing has built an economic position that the world can no longer afford to ignore, expanding its industrial capacity, developing trade infrastructure, and deepening economic ties with developing countries. The Belt and Road Initiative, investments in strategic infrastructure, and efforts to promote the international use of the renminbi form part of a long-term strategy to reduce dependence on Western-dominated structures. Yet China’s reliance on export markets and the constraints on the renminbi’s internationalization demonstrate how far Beijing remains from replacing Washington.
Meanwhile, the expansion of BRICS and growing interest in settling international trade in national currencies reflect a shift in governments’ economic calculations. Countries that once regarded the dollar as the only reliable means of conducting foreign trade are increasingly exploring alternatives. But reducing dependence on the dollar is not the same as ending its dominance. The depth of US financial markets, the liquidity of dollar-denominated assets, and the central role of US Treasury securities remain advantages that no rival has managed to replicate in combination.
More importantly, some of the pressure to reshape the existing economic order originates in Washington itself. The extensive use of financial sanctions, tightening technological restrictions, and renewed reliance on tariffs have sent a clear message to US trading partners: economic dependence can become a strategic vulnerability when political disagreements arise. Under such circumstances, diversifying trade relationships and payment channels is no longer merely an economic choice. It has become a strategic necessity.
Nevertheless, imagining a world without the US oversimplifies the complexities of the international economy. The United States continues to possess an exceptional combination of financial strength, innovative capacity, institutional influence, and attractive capital markets. Even economies seeking to diminish Washington’s influence remain dependent on US-linked economic structures for financing, exports, or access to technology. The central issue, therefore, is not the exclusion of the US from the global economy, but the declining ability of the United States to impose its preferences unilaterally on others.
For economies such as Iran’s, understanding this distinction is particularly important. An increasingly multipolar global economy may create opportunities to diversify trade and strengthen regional cooperation. Yet such opportunities do not automatically translate into economic advantages. Without domestic structural reforms, greater competitiveness, and fewer barriers to financial transactions, shifts in the global balance of power will not necessarily improve a country’s economic standing.
The reality is that the world is not preparing to say goodbye to the US. Rather, it is moving away from an era in which Washington could pass the costs of its decisions on to others with relatively little resistance. The emerging order is unlikely to be American in the traditional sense, or Chinese in the way Beijing might envision. Instead, it will increasingly become an arena of competing powers, none capable of setting all the rules alone.
Perhaps this is the most consequential transformation in the global economy: the US will remain a decisive power, but it can no longer take for granted that the rest of the world will always play by its rules.