Russia better positioned ...
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Recent remarks by Dmitry Medvedev about Moscow’s readiness to mediate, along with his emphasis that Russia will not sacrifice its strategic relations with Iran for any other actor, reinforce this message.Putin has also kept on the table the proposal to transfer Iran’s enriched uranium to Russia.
However, there is a serious limitation: Russia itself is involved in the war in Ukraine, and its credibility as a neutral party is in question. The main obstacle to the current deadlock is also the structural mistrust between Tehran and Washington, rather than the absence of a mediator. The US even distrusts Russia’s role as a custodian of Iran’s uranium. Therefore, this meeting will not lead to immediate progress on the nuclear issue, but it will likely cement Russia’s role as a key player in the Iran dossier.
Given that Russia is currently involved in the Ukraine war and faces a range of security and political challenges with the West, what role can Moscow play in managing the crisis between Iran and the United States? To what extent should Moscow’s capacity and tools for influencing this process be taken seriously?
Under the circumstances of the Ukraine war, Russia can be more of a “communication channel,” or at most an “actor influencing calculations,” than an effective mediator. Moscow’s capacity should be taken seriously, but not as that of a neutral mediator.
Russia’s main tools are several: its strategic relationship with Iran and access to decision-makers in Tehran; its permanent membership of the UN Security Council and veto power; proposals such as transferring Iran’s enriched uranium to Russia; and its capacity to coordinate with China.
But the limitations are also serious. The Ukraine war has turned Moscow into a party to the confrontation with the West and undermined its credibility as a neutral actor. There may therefore be concerns that Russia itself is under extensive sanctions and has an incentive to use the Iran dossier as leverage against the West, rather than necessarily seeking to resolve it.
Thus, Moscow can carry messages, open up space for back-channel consultations and influence Tehran’s calculations, but it is unlikely to emerge as an effective mediator in the short term.
Given Russia’s role in nuclear developments and negotiations related to Iran in recent years, could Moscow, if any understanding is reached between Tehran and Washington, play a role in facilitating the implementation of the parties’ commitments or establishing mechanisms to ease Iran’s concerns about the other side’s compliance?
Moscow can play a key role in the technical details of a nuclear agreement, particularly drawing on the experience of Rosatom. However, the limitations are serious. Trump has explicitly said that until the Ukraine war ends, he does not welcome Russia’s assistance on the Iran dossier. Russia itself is also engaged in a confrontation with the West, and its credibility as a neutral actor is in question. Moscow had previously even officially stated that it was not seeking to impose a mediating role on the parties.
To what extent can deepening Iran-Russia strategic cooperation and establishing more practical mechanisms to counter US pressure and sanctions help increase Iran’s bargaining power?
Deepening strategic cooperation with Russia can increase Iran’s bargaining power to some extent in the short term, but this increase is primarily tactical rather than strategic. The 20-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which took effect in October 2025, provides a framework for cooperation in the energy, transportation, banking and military sectors.
The most important practical benefit is sanctions-evasion mechanisms: linking the Shetab payment systems, trade in national currencies, and the North-South Corridor, which can help steer Iran’s trade routes away from Western bottlenecks. In the military sphere, intelligence and drone-technology cooperation raises the cost of any military adventurism against Iran.
However, important considerations must be taken into account. The treaty is not a defense pact and does not contain a “mutual defense” clause. Therefore, Iran cannot count on automatic Russian military support in the event of a conflict. On the other hand, Russia has important shared interests with parties involved in tensions with Iran, including Israel and the Persian Gulf states, and these considerations effectively limit Moscow’s room for maneuver.