Beijing’s ‘smart geoeconomics’ doctrine
By Mahdi Zolfaghari
Associate professor at
Allameh Tabataba’i university
The rapid transformations of the international system and the unprecedented escalation of geopolitical conflicts—from the Ukraine crisis to the intensifying tensions across West and East Asia—clearly signal the fracturing of the foundations of Western unipolar hegemony. In this volatile period of transition, China is not pursuing a path of hard, traditional confrontation; rather, by employing a doctrine of “smart geoeconomics,” it is redesigning global equations. Beijing has selected economic power, trade linkages, infrastructure investment, and corridor development as the primary levers of its foreign policy, aiming to shift the international balance of power in favor of the Global South and multilateral institutions without engaging in costly direct conflicts.
At the heart of this geoeconomic doctrine, most prominently manifested in the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), Iran holds an irreplaceable position. The Islamic Republic’s unique geopolitical and geo-energetic status connects three continents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—and serves as a transit crossroads linking the Persian Gulf to Central Asia and the Caucasus (via the North-South Corridor and East-West routes). For China, whose economic engine’s survival depends on the security of energy supply lines and the diversification of trade routes independent of the chokepoints dominated by the US Navy, Iran is not merely a temporary partner, but a “secure strategic anchor” in West Asia.
On the other hand, the escalation of tensions between Washington and Beijing regarding technology, tariffs, and the Taiwan Strait has demonstrated that the policy of containing China is a bipartisan and permanent strategy in the White House. This stark reality has proven to Chinese leaders that the era of “playing the Western card” has ended, and strategic balance now requires genuine alliance-building with revisionist powers that value independence and refuse to submit to unilateral sanction regimes.
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