Iran-US diplomacy needs ...
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The most important obstacle to the negotiations concerns the operational and implementation-oriented interpretation of the process by the two sides. The United States sees Iran’s nuclear issue as the starting point for new negotiations and the implementation of an agreement, whereas Iran believes that this issue is contingent on, and results from, the arrangement of the other components of the agreement alongside one another.
Therefore, the core dispute is that Iran’s proposed final step has become the United States’ proposed first step. Under such circumstances, mediation by other actors, no matter how diplomatically powerful they may be, becomes difficult. It is not easy to bridge the gap between these two points of disagreement or devise a third way forward. If another approach can be envisioned in this regard, it must serve the national interests of the Islamic Republic.
Another issue concerns [US President Donald] Trump’s particular approach of structuring the situation around a “short-term cost-benefit” calculation. This mental and analytical equation is constantly redefined in Trump’s mind, and this has resulted in the emergence of contradictory positions on his part.
The United States is dealing with a president whose thinking, unlike that of Obama, Biden and even George W. Bush, is not centered on a particular doctrine or fixed principle, whether in the realm of hard power or diplomacy.
Meanwhile, the role of the Israeli regime cannot be overlooked. Tel Aviv can upend the agreement in question at any moment, even if it is concluded. [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu’s position at the helm of Tel Aviv’s political and executive affairs, as well as his fear of losing the upcoming general election, cannot be ignored at this sensitive juncture.
Given Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping and China’s emphasis on the need for Iran and the United States to return to the negotiating track, what impact could this meeting have on the two sides’ diplomatic process? Can Beijing play a more active role at this stage in mediating, bringing the two sides’ positions closer, or guaranteeing the implementation of a possible agreement?
Certainly. China cannot be regarded as being on the same level as Pakistan, Qatar and Oman. In addition to its ability to mediate, China has the power to shape the game and manage the situation.
China’s economic power, geopolitical concerns, and its tactical and strategic points of convergence and divergence with Washington are highly influential in shaping this equation. China and the United States both view past, current and future developments in the international system as a multi-piece puzzle and establish meaningful links between all phenomena and their relationship with their own strategic and tactical concerns.
I believe that China can play a prominent role both in shaping a new equation and in guaranteeing it.
What lessons does the experience of the Islamabad understanding and the disputes that emerged afterward over the interpretation and implementation of commitments hold for a possible new agreement between Iran and the United States? To prevent such disputes from recurring, what mechanisms should be put in place?
It appears that the most important keyword relevant to this question is “guarantee”, rather than “commitment”. A memorandum of understanding aimed at ending a war must focus on the tools, levers and arrangements that make it impossible to violate or misinterpret its provisions.
The Islamabad understanding was based on “commitment”, not “guarantee”. A commitment is something that is put down on paper, whereas a guarantee is a tool through which one makes sure such a commitment is necessarily implemented by the parties to the dispute.
This principle did not apply to the Islamabad understanding, to the extent that the United States violated it from the very moment it was concluded. The continuation of Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Qatar’s failure to release Iran’s frozen assets, which was carried out on US orders, are clear examples of this.
Moreover, the creation of a second route, or the so-called southern route, through the Strait of Hormuz was in direct conflict with Article 5 of the Islamabad understanding concerning Iran’s management of the strait during the initial period covered by the understanding.
Nevertheless, there was no tool or guarantee in place that could force Washington to pay a price for violating these provisions.
Therefore, the focus of any negotiations with the other side should now be on guarantees and the tools needed to enforce the provisions.