Trump’s push to ...
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Washington now believes the economic pressure created by the blockade could put Iran in a weaker position and enable it to obtain greater nuclear concessions. From this perspective, simply reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for lifting the blockade would amount to a return to the prewar situation and could expose Trump to criticism that he had failed to achieve additional nuclear concessions.
That is why the US approach is to combine lifting the blockade and reopening the strait with nuclear negotiations. Iran, however, wants the Hormuz issue, the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen funds and an end to the war on all fronts to be addressed first, followed by separate nuclear negotiations without the blockade being used as leverage.
Trump told Axios that he is approaching a major decision on whether to resume massive attacks and will consult Persian Gulf Arab leaders. Could this be an effort to increase pressure before presenting a new proposal to Tehran?
Trump’s overall approach is “peace through strength.” He keeps military pressure and coercion alongside diplomacy and conducts diplomacy under that pressure, seeking to make Iran provide the concessions he wants. His statement about approaching an important decision can therefore serve as an instrument of pressure.
Trump’s approach after the US congressional midterm elections will also become clearer. If the results lead to a defeat, he may adopt a tougher approach. Even if he wins, he would have greater room to pursue a more coercive policy. Therefore, the assessment that the current situation could continue until the US elections, followed by a Trump defeat and his return to negotiations with less leverage, is not necessarily correct.
After the election results, Trump could prepare for broader military action against Iran unless Tehran offers significant nuclear concessions. One issue on which the United States has placed considerable emphasis is Iran’s stockpile of 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. Trump could seek this concession and present it to the American public as evidence that he had achieved an important result in the war.
The United States is also seeking to shape the regional order after the war. Its approach includes advancing the Abraham Accords and normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Washington has so far not accepted a formal mutual-defense commitment with any Persian Gulf Arab country and instead views regional security within a broader framework.
The recent meeting between CENTCOM commanders and some Arab and Israeli military commanders can also be viewed in this context. In the event of further escalation, Washington seeks greater coordination, intelligence cooperation and work toward an integrated regional defense system as part of the regional order it wants to establish.
Trump has said the naval blockade has restricted Iran’s oil exports, while Iran considers lifting the blockade one of its conditions. Could resolving the Strait of Hormuz be a first step toward reducing tensions and reopening negotiations?
The United States currently wants to address the nuclear issue alongside the Strait of Hormuz. It does not view lifting the naval blockade as a first step. Instead, it wants the two issues to be considered simultaneously as one package.
Iran’s preference is different. Tehran wants the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of the blockade and its other conditions to be addressed first, followed by nuclear negotiations.
The US approach allows Washington to use the economic leverage created by the blockade to obtain nuclear concessions. Iran had expected that it could withstand the economic pressure over time and that the impact of higher energy prices on the global economy, the US and its allies would eventually increase Washington’s incentive to compromise.
However, the United States now says it can export some oil through the southern corridor without causing a major increase in energy prices. If that assessment holds, Washington could have greater economic resilience and retain the blockade as leverage in nuclear negotiations.
If Washington sends a new proposal through Pakistan that combines the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear issue in one package, what would be Iran’s main obstacles to accepting it?
The first obstacle is Iran’s opposition to direct US involvement in a mechanism for the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has repeatedly said the issue is not connected to the United States and should be resolved through a bilateral mechanism with Oman or through a broader regional arrangement.
The second obstacle is that Iran does not want the naval blockade to be used as leverage in nuclear negotiations. Tehran wants the two issues separated. It wants the Strait of Hormuz to be handled through its own mechanism, without direct US involvement, while the nuclear issue should be discussed separately on the basis of nuclear provisions and without the pressure of the blockade.
Iran is therefore unlikely to agree to the US formula. At the same time, Washington believes the blockade can put significant pressure on Iran’s economy and place Tehran in a weaker position. Its assessment is therefore that it will not enter negotiations until Iran is prepared to make nuclear concessions.