55 years of Iran-China relations
Test of a strategic partnership
Iran and China just celebrated the 55th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, a relationship that, over the last five decades, has expanded from political and economic cooperation to energy, trade, and regional affairs. Naturally, in recent years, this relationship with the eastern superpower has assumed greater significance for Tehran amid the intensification of Western sanctions. Nevertheless, alongside the depth of bilateral ties, questions persist regarding the extent to which the relationship’s potential has been realized and, in particular, what “strategic partnership” means for the two sides. The recent Iran–US war also once again underscored the question of how far China is willing to incur costs for its relations with Iran at critical junctures and where it places its own interests above Tehran’s expectations. To mark the anniversary of Iran–China diplomatic relations, Iran Daily conducted an exclusive interview with Mohammadreza Elhami, vice president of the Iran–China Friendship Association, about more than five decades of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Beijing, the two nations’ seemingly divergent conceptions of strategic partnership, Beijing’s conduct during the recent war, and the outlook for their bilateral relations.
By Sadeq Dehqan
Staff writer
IRAN DAILY: Iran and China just celebrated the 55th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. So, this is an appropriate opportunity to assess the evolution of these ties. When did these formal relations begin, and what trajectory have they followed?
ELHAMI: If we are to examine the history of formal diplomatic relations between Iran and the People’s Republic of China, we must identify 1971 as their point of inception. Formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were established that year, and they have continued to the present day.
Of course, contact between Iran and China has a far more extensive history and dates back to ancient times, but formal political relations between the two countries in the modern era commenced in 1971.
At that time, too, the establishment of Iran’s relations with the People’s Republic of China took place under particular international circumstances. The People’s Republic of China had been established in 1949, but for years a substantial proportion of Western countries did not recognize it and regarded the Republic of China, based in Taiwan, as China’s representative. Iran, too, belonged to the Western bloc and maintained close relations with the United States.
During the 1970s, China–US relations also entered a new phase. Nixon’s visit to China, Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic efforts, and the developments known as “ping-pong diplomacy” created the conditions for the normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington. Ping-pong diplomacy refers to the talks between the United States and China during the 1970s. At that time, the two countries still lacked formal diplomatic relations with one another and used the staging of a table-tennis tournament as a pretext for conducting negotiations. In such an environment, Iran also established formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1971.
Following the Islamic Revolution, relations between the two countries continued, and in 1981, the first ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran was dispatched to China. Therefore, if we consider the entirety of formal relations, we are now celebrating 55 years of diplomatic ties, and if we examine the period of the Islamic Republic, approximately 45 years of the two countries’ formal relations have elapsed under the current establishments.
Over these 55 years, can Iran–China relations genuinely be considered a “strategic partnership”? In Iran, at least, China is generally regarded as one of the country’s strategic partners.
Here, we must distinguish between Iran’s conception of “strategic partnership” and China’s definition of the concept. China has never placed Iran in a position comparable to that of certain of its particular partners in the sense that we, in Iran, expect of a strategic partner. For example, China maintains relations with Pakistan that are exceptionally deep and strategic in certain domains, with extensive military, security, and economic cooperation between them. A comparable level of relations has not developed in the case of Iran.
The reason is also largely attributable to the divergence in the two countries’ objectives and circumstances. Beginning in the late 1970s, China adopted a policy of reform and opening-up and gradually expanded its economic relations with the United States, Europe, and the wider world. During the same period, Iran’s relations with the United States were severed following the 1979 Revolution, and Iran and the United States also became two of the most significant adversaries of one another.
Therefore, we cannot expect China, under circumstances in which it maintains extensive economic relations with the United States and Western countries, to act toward Iran in a manner that would place all those interests at risk.
So, should one of the principal reasons for China’s caution be sought in its relationship with the United States?
Yes, that is one of the most important factors. Of course, China–US relations today are themselves characterized by highly serious competition, but the two countries nevertheless maintain extremely extensive economic relations.
While competing with the United States, China seeks to preserve its economic and strategic interests. It therefore does not want its relationship with Iran to assume a form that would eliminate all its capacity for engagement with the United States and Europe.
This issue assumes particular importance under sanctions. The Chinese government may maintain good political relations with Iran and even cooperate in certain areas, but many major Chinese companies are multinational corporations and possess extensive interests in global markets. These companies cannot readily accept the risks associated with US sanctions.
For this reason, even during periods when the Iranian government has demonstrated a strong inclination to develop relations with China, we have encountered constraints in areas such as finance and investment.
Nevertheless, in recent years, particularly during the sanctions period, China has been one of the few countries that has continued purchasing Iranian oil. Should this action be regarded as China’s strategic support for Iran?
The purchase of Iranian oil is, to some extent, an economic necessity for China and, to some extent, may be analyzed within the framework of assisting Iran in navigating the pressures of sanctions; ultimately, however, a reciprocal interest exists. China requires oil, and Iran requires a market for selling its oil. Therefore, this relationship cannot be construed solely as a political or supportive action on China’s part.
In many instances, China has sought to cooperate with Iran within the framework of its own interests, while simultaneously asking Tehran not to become embroiled in tensions with regional countries.
In this context, the recent Iran–US war was an important test for Tehran–Beijing relations. In your view, did China demonstrate the support that Iran expected from a strategic partner during this war?
If our criterion for strategic partnership is military support and direct involvement in security conflicts, my answer is no. China did not assume such a role toward Iran, and, fundamentally, expecting such a level of support from Beijing is unrealistic.
China shares political positions with Iran on certain issues, including opposition to US hegemony and support for the emergence of a multipolar international order. This does not, however, mean that China will enter the field in every military conflict involving Iran or place its military capabilities and sensitive technologies at Iran’s disposal.
Again, for example, China maintains a different level of cooperation in its military relations with Pakistan and provides that country with advanced military equipment and technology. No such model exists in its relationship with Iran. We must therefore distinguish between political alignment on certain issues and a strategic and security alliance.
China simultaneously maintains extensive relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. Do these relations affect the nature of Beijing’s engagement with Tehran?
Yes. China acts in pursuit of its own national interests, and this is entirely natural. Iran is important to China, but China does not formulate its Middle East policy solely on the basis of its relationship with Iran.
Beijing maintains important economic and strategic relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other countries in the region. China also purchases these countries’ oil and attaches importance to their markets, investments, and infrastructure projects.
China’s role in normalizing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia also demonstrated that Beijing seeks to increase its influence in the region while maintaining ties with all major regional actors. China therefore does not want to choose between Iran and the Arab countries. Its policy is based more on equilibrium and the preservation of relations with all sides.
In Iran, expectations of China regarding issues such as war or regional affairs are sometimes higher than what we observe from it in practice. Should Iran revise its expectations of China?
In my view, yes. We must adopt a more realistic perspective on the relationship. China formulates its foreign policy on the basis of its own national interests. It does not pursue a hostile policy toward Iran and, unlike the United States, its approach is fundamentally not based on confrontation with Iran. This does not, however, mean that China will set aside its own interests to secure Iran’s interests.
It is better to characterize China’s policy as “cautious,” rather than hostile. If China concludes that a deeper relationship with Iran serves its own national interests, it will certainly develop that relationship. If, however, it believes that a particular form of cooperation with Iran would result in the loss of more important interests in the United States, Europe, or the region, it will naturally exercise caution.
So, perhaps part of the problem stems from the fact that Iran and China have different expectations of the concept of strategic partnership?
Precisely. In Iran, when we speak of strategic partnership, we sometimes expect that this partnership should manifest itself across all domains, from the economy and investment to military and political affairs. From China’s perspective, however, strategic partnership does not necessarily entail the acceptance of unlimited risk. China seeks cooperation that also generates economic and strategic benefits for itself.
For this reason, the 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement between Iran and China, by itself, cannot transform the two countries into a strategic partnership in the sense expected by Iran. This agreement has considerable potential for cooperation, but a significant portion of it has not reached the implementation stage.
Why, despite the 25-year cooperation agreement, have the objectives of this program and Chinese investment in Iran have not materialized in proportion to the expectations it generated?
Here, we must consider both Iran’s problems and China’s constraints. Within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has undertaken extremely large investments in various countries, from Central Asia and Pakistan to Arab countries. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was even established to finance infrastructure projects.
Iran has not been able to utilize these capacities as it should have. China, for its part, has entered Iranian projects cautiously because of sanctions, financial difficulties, FATF, and its companies’ concerns about US penalties.
Therefore, the problem is not simply that China does not want to invest in Iran. Iran’s economic environment must also be made conducive to foreign investment. As we have seen, during periods when Iran’s relations with the West were more normalized, Chinese and European companies entered Iran with greater confidence, but following the reimposition of sanctions, many of them withdrew.
If that is the case, what must Iran do to transform its relationship with China into genuine, long-term economic cooperation?
In my view, the most important issue is that Iran must move away from a zigzag foreign policy. We should not incline excessively toward the East one day and excessively toward the West the next. Specifically, by inclination toward the West, I mean periods such as the JCPOA, when we become inattentive to the East. The correct policy for Iran, in my opinion, is a form of positive equilibrium; that is, we should maintain economic cooperation with both the East and the West without relinquishing our political independence.
China is the world’s second most powerful country and a country that has not had a fundamental or hostile conflict with Iran over the past several decades. China can therefore constitute one of the important pillars of Iran’s foreign and economic relations, but we must not imagine that China is a substitute for the entire world. We must work with China while simultaneously developing our economic relations with Europe, regional countries, India, Japan, and other economic powers.
Could improved relations between Iran and the West, and even the resolution of hostility with the United States, really lead to stronger economic relations between Iran and China?
Yes. In fact, I believe this is one of the important points that must be taken into consideration in Iran. The more the pressure of sanctions is reduced and the more Iran is able to conduct normal economic activity within the framework of international regulations and mechanisms, the more easily Chinese companies will be able to work with Iran.
Politically, China and Iran hold similar views on many issues, but the principal problem lies in the economic sphere. Chinese companies do not want to lose their major markets in the United States and Europe because of their activities in Iran. Therefore, the resolution of hostility and the reduction of sanctions could even create the conditions for greater investment and a larger presence of Chinese companies in Iran.
In this regard, what role could improved relations between Iran and regional countries and regional agreements — such as the joint defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey — play in Tehran–Beijing relations?
In my view, reducing tensions between Iran and regional countries could represent a highly important opportunity. China has consistently asked Iran not to become embroiled in tensions with regional countries and to improve its relations with them. China welcomed the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and, in principle, the greater the stability in the region, the more favorable it is for China’s economic and energy interests.
If Iran can normalize its relations with regional countries to a greater extent, this issue would not only pose no threat to its relationship with China but could also create the conditions for expanded Chinese cooperation with Iran. In fact, we must ensure that our relations with regional countries, and even the reduction of hostility with the United States, become an opportunity for developing economic relations with Beijing rather than a threat to our relationship with China.
Given that the span of diplomatic relations between the two countries has reached 55 years, if you were to offer one specific recommendation for the future of Iran–China relations, what would you say?
In my view, the most important issue is to move beyond the slogan of “strategic partnership” and toward mutual interests and practical cooperation. China is not Iran’s enemy and does not pursue a hostile policy toward Iran, but China, like every other country, also pursues its own national interests first. If cooperation with Iran benefits China, Beijing will develop that cooperation.
Iran, for its part, must make its economic and legal environment more conducive to foreign investment, enhance regulatory stability, reduce banking and financial difficulties, and utilize China’s capacities in areas such as infrastructure, technology, and investment.
Conversely, if China genuinely wishes to preserve and strengthen its position in Iran, it must go beyond a purely commercial relationship and the sale of goods and assume a more substantial presence in investment, technology transfer, industrial development, and the creation of productive capacity in Iran.
We must not view China merely as a market for selling oil or as a supplier of goods, and the Chinese must not regard Iran solely as a consumer market.
If the two countries can transform shared interests into reciprocal benefits and sustainable economic projects, Iran–China relations can then transcend the level of political and tactical relations and develop into a deeper and more durable relationship.