New regional security ...
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Yet, this is also true that Saudi Arabia confronts substantial threats along its borders and adjacent regions including in northeastern Africa, Pakistan is embroiled in conflicts with India, and Turkey faces escalating issues with Israel.
Given that it has been announced that this pact is not directed against any specific country, could it, in practice, be influenced by the rivalries between Iran and the Arab states or by developments pertaining to Israel?
Iran’s approach to the agreement has not, to this point, been securitized, and it does not appear that this pact will exert a deleterious effect upon Iran’s relations with its member states. However, the introduction of the question of Iran’s membership in this agreement could engender further contradictions within the accord and, of course, would accentuate its anti-Israeli dimension.
One crucial point that must be considered is that this trilateral agreement is, in its essence, more anti-Israeli, even if the member states deny this fact. Saudi Arabia, far more than Pakistan or Turkey, possesses absolutely no interest in being part of arrangements that acquire an anti-Israeli label.
What is your perspective on Iran’s accession to this agreement and the rationales for or against Iran’s membership from the standpoint of the national interests and security of the Islamic Republic?
Iran is one of the preeminent countries of the region, possessing the longest coastline along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, constituting a significant military power, and ranking among the principal actors in regional energy security and maritime navigation. Consequently, the formation of regional security arrangements without Iran is not feasible, or, should such arrangements materialize, they will inevitably precipitate the emergence of countervailing security arrangements.
Therefore, the official stance of Tehran has thus far not been fundamentally negative, and Tehran truly possesses no cause for concerns regarding the agreement; moreover, from a more profoundly analytical perspective, the joint defense agreement will ultimately entail implicit and indirect opportunities for Iran. In sum, discourse concerning Iran’s membership in the agreement is entirely political, although it is theoretically and idealistically sound.
The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs has welcomed Iran’s accession to the pact; why has Russia advanced such a proposal? Is Moscow concerned about the formation of a regional security structure without Iran’s participation, or does Russia harbor other distinct interests deriving from such membership?
The introduction of the question of Iran’s membership in the trilateral agreement by certain parties, such as Russia, assuredly emanates, to a significant degree, from that country’s overarching political positions concerning the region. Russia has repeatedly declared its support for the establishment of a regional security arrangement for peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and has even expressed its readiness to push an initiative in this regard. In my view, the raising of the issue of Iran’s membership in the agreement by Russia ought to be evaluated within the framework of Moscow’s macro-level stances concerning the Persian Gulf.