New regional security framework essentially anti-Israel: Expert
By Sadeq Dehqan
Staff writer
The formation of the joint defense pact among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan may be considered one of the noteworthy developments in the security equations of West Asia. In the following interview with Afifeh Abedi, an expert on regional and international affairs, we have examined the dimensions and objectives of the pact, the motivations of its member states, and the potential opportunities and challenges that Iran’s participation in this treaty bring.
IRAN DAILY: What objectives does this agreement pursue, and in what method does it differ from a classical defense pact, a military coalition, or other regional security mechanisms?
ABEDI: In my estimation, the joint defense agreement ought to be evaluated as yet another indication of the perceived gap in the security institutional framework of the West Asian region and the palpable sentiment of instability or insecurity pervading the area. Based on official positions, public statements, and available evidence, it has been constituted with Saudi Arabia as its focal point and initiative.
Among the most salient rationales to which numerous observers have cited is the security repercussions of the American and Israeli war against Iran upon Saudi Arabia’s security. In the wake of recent conflicts, Saudi Arabia appears to have arrived at the conclusion that its alliance with the United States is insufficient for the provision of its national security, and that Riyadh requires supplementary security measures to augment its deterrent capabilities. For this reason, it has summoned Pakistan, as a nuclear power in the region, to this pact and, on the other hand, has incorporated Turkey, as one of the world’s preeminent military forces and a NATO member, into this agreement.
Thus, this pact should not be regarded, at least for the present, as a classical defense pact because a classical defense pact ordinarily conduces to the establishment of infrastructures that this one currently lacks. Among these deficiencies is the fact that a fully integrated military organization with a command structure, joint forces, a unified budget, and operational planning analogous to NATO has not yet been instituted for this pact. Notwithstanding, the clause stipulating that “an attack on one shall be construed as an attack on all” constitutes a thoroughly classical element of collective defense.
Simultaneously, the motivations and objectives of the member states in this pact — which, for the time being, might more appropriately be designated a “defense agreement” — are disparate. Riyadh seeks to generate, alongside its security relations with the United States, additional regional capacities for its own defense. Turkey, for its part, desires to exploit its geostrategic position, military capability, and defense industries to assume a more substantial role within the regional security architecture. Pakistan, in addition to its historical ties with Saudi Arabia, can, through this agreement, elevate its status from that of a bilateral security partner to an effective actor in the security of the Persian Gulf and the Islamic world.
Is the formation of the pact merely a reaction to recent developments and fears regarding Iran, or ought it to be interpreted as part of a long-term transformation in the Middle Eastern security architecture?
Inasmuch as the war against Iran has constituted one of the most significant contexts for the emergence of this agreement, Iran undeniably represents one of the salient components within this defense accord. Nevertheless, given the divergent approaches of the three countries toward Iran and the far more consequential issues with which each of these states is preoccupied, it appears that the accentuated narrative of Iranophobia concerning this pact has been, to a considerable extent, a discursive line propagated by Western-Zionist media.
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