Redefining Persian Gulf security architecture after Hormuz crisis
End of old order or beginning of new balance?
By Sharareh Abdolhosseinzadeh
Political Science Researcherexpert
In the Persian Gulf, crises often expose the weaknesses of the existing order before paving the way for a new one. The recent crisis surrounding Iran is not merely a confrontation between Tehran and its regional and international opponents; it is also a sign of a deeper shift in the region’s security architecture, which for decades has rested on one fundamental assumption: that the military presence of an outside power can guarantee stability in the Persian Gulf.
Recent developments, however, have shown that security in the Persian Gulf can no longer be explained through the logic of the post-Cold War era. A region where great-power rivalry was once largely managed through military bases, naval fleets and formal alliances now faces a more complex set of threats, ranging from long-range missiles and low-cost drones to cyberattacks, information warfare, vulnerabilities in energy infrastructure, and growing competition among regional and global powers. From this perspective, the most important consequence of the Iran crisis may not be an immediate shift in the balance of power, but rather the exposure of the limitations of the traditional security model in the Persian Gulf.
End of one power’s monopoly
Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States has been the main pillar of the region’s security architecture. The US military presence in the Persian Gulf, defense cooperation with the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and Washington’s role in providing deterrence have shaped the main framework of the regional order.
Recent crises, however, have highlighted an important reality: military power, even at the highest level, cannot by itself produce lasting security. The experience of missile and drone attacks on critical infrastructure across the region has shown that new threats can be posed by actors at a much lower cost while still causing significant damage. This does not mean the end of the US role in the Persian Gulf. Contrary to some interpretations, China and Russia do not have the capacity to replace the US security role in the short term. Washington still has intelligence superiority, global military capabilities, a network of allies and operational capacities that no other actor in or outside the region can fully replace.
What has changed, however, is the nature of the US role. An era in which regional countries relied entirely on a single external power to define and provide security is gradually giving way to an era of multilayered partnerships, in which the United States remains a major player but is no longer the sole decisive actor.
One of the most complex issues in the Persian Gulf is a cycle in which one actor’s efforts to enhance its own security increase the sense of insecurity among others. From Iran’s perspective, the US military presence near its borders, extensive arms sales to Arab countries, and efforts to establish security alliances against Tehran are viewed as threats to Iran’s national security. Accordingly, Tehran believes that security in the Persian Gulf should be managed by the littoral states without the presence of outside powers.
By contrast, many Arab Gulf countries view Iran’s missile capabilities, regional influence and asymmetric capabilities as the main sources of their security concerns and believe that maintaining the balance of power would be difficult without external backing.
These conflicting perceptions are the biggest obstacle to creating an inclusive security order in the region. The main problem in the Persian Gulf is not simply a lack of military power; it is the absence of strategic trust among its actors.
The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries have pursued a complex, multifaceted policy in recent years. On the one hand, they still need security cooperation with the United States, but on the other, they are seeking to reduce their complete dependence on a single external power.
Page 3