Veteran pilot talks about fate of three comrades who struck US base
What made Al Udeid one of most intricate aerial missions?
The destiny of the three Iranian pilots who participated in the March 2 operation of retaliating against the Al Udeid American air base in Qatar, even after the passage of several months, remains shrouded in obscurity; an obscurity that has acquired novel dimensions consequent to the discordant stances of Iran and Qatar. While Iranian authorities have recently asserted that the three pilots are alive in captivity, Qatar has repudiated this assertion and claims ignorance concerning their fate. In the meantime, the martyrdom of Brigadier General Majid Kazemi has been confirmed, and the remains of this distinguished pilot have been repatriated; however, the status of the other three pilots is indeterminate. Nevertheless, from the perspective of experts, the operation of March 2, 2026, constituted, from a technical and military standpoint, an intricate and exceptionally perilous mission, an operation wherein Iranian combat aircraft, penetrating multiple defensive layers, infiltrated the Al Udeid base and successfully inflicted damage upon this consequential American installation. To scrutinize the diverse dimensions of this aerial operation and also to conduct a technical assessment of the various probabilities concerning the fate of the pilots, Iran Daily engaged in an exclusive dialogue with Brigadier General Hossein Khalili, a veteran of the Air Force and a pilot who participated in numerous operations during the eight-year Sacred Defense period (Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s); the full transcript of which you shall read below:
By Sadeq
Dehqan
Staff writer
IRAN DAILY: In light of the divergent narratives advanced concerning the operation of March 2, 2026, and the destiny of the three Iranian pilots, if we wish to examine this affair from the perspective of a pilot and with a technical and military lens, what is your evaluation of this operation?
KHALILI: To analyze this operation, we must initially attend to the type of aircraft, the target, and the conditions in which the pilots were situated. The Sukhoi Su-34 aircraft is a semi-strategic fighter-bomber and ranks among the heaviest interceptor aircraft globally. This aircraft, in terms of both its physical dimensions and weight, as well as the quantity of ordnance it can carry, possesses considerable capability for such missions.
Consequently, the selection of this aircraft for an assault upon a significant and strategic target, such as the Al Udeid base, is militarily comprehensible because the aircraft can transport a substantial volume of munitions.
To what extent was the operation, in terms of the design and the planning for the execution of an aerial operation, distinguished?
Apparently, the execution of the operation had been scheduled for March 1; however, its implementation was postponed by one day due to particular circumstances. In such aerial missions, the selection of the route customarily has tremendous importance. Fundamentally, a pilot endeavors to approach the target via a trajectory that minimizes the probability of detection. In this instance as well, it appears the route was chosen such that the aircraft would enter the vicinity of the Al Udeid base from a direction toward which the adversary’s anti-aircraft defenses were not primarily oriented. For example, if the adversary anticipates an assault from a specific axis, it is natural that it would concentrate its radar and defensive systems more heavily along that same axis. Therefore, altering the angle of entry and approaching from an unanticipated direction can contribute to the mission’s success.
Thus, could one assert that the initial success of the operation was largely contingent upon the surprise of the defenses?
That is correct. Surprise constitutes one of the critical factors for the success of any military operation. On this basis, the aircraft entered Qatari territory, advanced somewhat into the depth of the area, then adjusted their trajectory to reach the target and maneuvered from the southern sector toward their objectives at the Al Udeid base. This method resulted in the defenses having a diminished window for effective reaction because, from a defensive standpoint, the adversary anticipated the attack would originate from the north of the base, and the deployment and targeting of defensive systems had been concentrated in that area; however, our operation planners and pilots, through an astute maneuver, assaulted the base from the southern sector.
This action also possessed another advantage: if our fighters had targeted the base from the northern sector, during their exit and alteration of course and heading back toward Iran, the adversary’s defenses would have enjoyed a greater opportunity to target our fighters; but when the bombardment was executed from the southern sector, our fighters had a direct trajectory for their return.
Nevertheless, a crucial point exists; the moment the bombardment is executed, the element of surprise effectively dissipates. From that instant onward, all systems within the area become cognizant of the presence of the attacking aircraft, and the return mission becomes considerably more difficult. Up to this point, that segment of the mission which had been planned for the base’s bombardment was accomplished successfully.
Another factor that rendered this operation more intricate was that one day prior to this operation, two of our F-5s, flying at low altitude and penetrating advanced American aerial defense systems, inflicted severe damage upon the infrastructure of a United States Air Force base in Kuwait and, having successfully executed the aerial assault, landed in Bushehr. Naturally, when an operation has been conducted in the region the preceding day, the alertness level of opposing forces increases, and the repetition of an operation within a short interval can elevate the probability of detection and identification. And this matter concurrently increased the risk of executing the operation at the Al Udeid base.
Therefore, could one assert that the more hazardous segment of the mission was perhaps subsequent to the execution of the bombardment and during the return?
Precisely. As long as you are approaching, you endeavor to remain undetected; but after releasing the bombs, you can no longer remain concealed. The region’s radars, defensive systems, aerial patrol aircraft, and even naval vessels can enter the process of identification and interdiction.
Furthermore, Al Udeid air base is not a conventional installation. It is a major American base and, naturally, possesses multiple defensive layers. There, a variety of defensive and radar systems exist, and in addition, aerial patrol coverage is also a consideration. American and Qatari aircraft can be present in the region. On the other hand, American naval vessels stationed in the area themselves possess radar systems and aerial coverage.
In preceding years, when we flew in Iran’s southern areas, even under conditions where the presence of American naval vessels was not as extensive as it is today, we observed that they could detect an aircraft from a considerable distance. Therefore, for an Iranian aircraft to be able to enter such a region, bombard the target, and then undertake the return trajectory was, operationally, an exceedingly complex undertaking.
One of the points noted concerning this operation was the extremely low-altitude flight of our fighters. What significance did this factor possess?
Low-altitude flight constitutes one of the methods employed to reduce the probability of radar detection. Extremely low-altitude flight (25 to 50 meters above the water’s surface) or even in proximity to the ground, which not every pilot can accomplish, was also selected to evade radar detection and to complicate interception by missiles because, by flying at low altitude, the margin of error for missiles increases.
However, a pilot at extremely low altitude must navigate with extraordinary precision, and the slightest error can precipitate fatal consequences. Therefore, the selection of low altitude demonstrates that the pilots endeavored to diminish the probability of early detection to the greatest feasible extent.
This operation naturally revives the memory of the flight of the martyr Abbas Doran over Baghdad on July 21, 1982, and his penetration of one of the densest Iraqi defensive networks, which, despite the mission’s success, ultimately resulted in his martyrdom; what is your opinion?
Correct. From one perspective, one could even state that this operation involved extraordinarily risky conditions and, in certain aspects, could be even more perilous than the operation of martyr Doran during the Iraqi-imposed war because the existence of the multi-layered defensive network of the American Al Udeid base, the more advanced nature of the radar systems, anti-aircraft artillery, radar-guided surface-to-air missiles, continuous aerial patrols, and the presence of American naval vessels at a distance of 15 to 20 miles rendered the conditions for penetration into the operational area and its execution extremely challenging.
If we wish to speak candidly and from a pilot’s viewpoint, such a mission cannot be regarded as an everyday mission. A pilot knows that upon entering such a region, he confronts an assemblage of threats, ranging from defensive systems to adversary fighters and radar and naval coverage.
With this calculation, did the pilots accept this mission knowing that, in all probability, no return was possible?
The pilots, with complete cognizance that the probability of return was only 10% and that they effectively considered their death largely inevitable, embarked upon this mission. Nonetheless, they knew the mission had to be executed; that is the very characteristic that also existed in the great operations of the Sacred Defense period, wherein pilots, despite deeming the probability of martyrdom extremely high, still accepted the mission. And this constitutes the distinction between our combatants and pilots and the forces of the adversary. That which we designate as the culture of martyrdom is precisely this: that our combatant possesses no fear of confronting the enemy despite the inequality of equipment and the equations of warfare.
Given that the pilots have not returned yet but the attack upon the Al Udeid base was successfully executed, should this operation be considered an operational success?
If an aircraft can enter an area with such a level of protection, strike the target, and accomplish its mission, then from a military perspective, this segment of the operation is considered successful. It is natural that in a combat operation, you also incorporate into your calculations the risk of losing the aircraft and crew. But in return, you may be able to inflict damage upon the adversary and execute the assigned mission, just as our pilots inflicted substantial damage upon the American Al Udeid base in Qatar.
One of the significant ambiguities concerns the fate of the three pilots about whom conflicting narratives have been put forward. From a technical standpoint, does the possibility of their survival and captivity exist?
Here, we must distinguish between definitive information and the analysis of probabilities. If the aircraft was downed and the pilots were able to eject, then from a technical standpoint, the possibility of survival and captivity exists. It is possible he landed in the region and was apprehended by forces present there. Consequently, given the presence of American forces at the Al Udeid base, the probability that the pilots were apprehended by American forces is not ruled out.
Of course, this is an analysis, and for it to become definitive news, it requires credible information and official confirmation. It is even possible that if such an event occurred, the opposing side, for various reasons, might not announce the matter, particularly under conditions where the possibility of continued hostilities exists.
Of course, concerning the martyrdom of two of the pilots in those same days, narratives were disseminated; subsequently, however, the martyrdom of Brigadier General Majid Kazemi was officially confirmed, and the remains of this martyr were repatriated. In your opinion, to what extent are those earlier narratives reliable?
In such incidents, the information from the initial days is customarily incomplete. It is possible that, initially, based on preliminary evidence, it might be surmised that two of the crew were martyred, and later, with the discovery of the aircraft’s wreckage or new information, the details become clearer.
Regarding this incident as well, if the remains of one of the pilots have been found, this matter does not, in and of itself, signify that the status of all crew members has been clarified. Concerning the other individual or individuals, independent evidence must exist. Therefore, one cannot assert with certainty that all have been martyred or that the remaining are alive. Both probabilities must, from a technical standpoint, be examined until definitive information is clarified.
What is Qatar’s role in this matter? If the operation occurred within Qatari territory, does the Qatari government necessarily possess knowledge of the pilots’ fate?
The matter is somewhat complex. Iran has announced that the operation’s target was the American base in Qatar and that, in reality, the engagement was with the United States, not Qatar. Therefore, Qatar might dissociate its direct responsibility from this incident.
If we assume one of the pilots has been taken captive, why might this matter not be announced?
In wartime conditions, information concerning prisoners of war and military personnel can be a matter of security. The opposing side might have various reasons for not announcing it. Moreover, if the two sides remain engaged, the matter of prisoners could subsequently arise in negotiations or prisoner exchanges.
However, I emphasize that this is merely a probability, and to offer a definitive opinion on the pilots’ fate, one must await official and verifiable information.
Finally, if you were to elucidate the importance of this operation from your own perspective, how would you describe it?
In my view, this operation should be considered within the framework of the greatest operations of Iran’s Air Force. The matter is not merely about several aircraft going and bombing a target. You enter a region, with aircraft, that is under multi-layered radar, defensive, aerial, and naval coverage, and you know that subsequent to the mission’s execution, the probability of return is extremely low.
From this perspective, this operation, in terms of the degree of risk and the fearlessness of the pilots, ranks among the greatest aerial operations in the history of the country. Perhaps the most significant point is precisely this: that the pilots accepted the mission with full knowledge of the extraordinarily great dangers. When a pilot knows the probability of return is extremely low but still flies, this is not merely a military mission; rather, it demonstrates the magnitude of his commitment to the execution of the mission.