Iran-US ceasefire deal to need Persian Gulf coalition guarantees
By Delaram Ahmadi
Staff writer
After more than 10 days of fighting between the United States and Iran, Qatar is said to have reportedly put forward a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire. However, at a time when the United States is simultaneously building up its military presence in the region, Iran’s willingness to accept such a proposal remains in doubt. In an interview with Iran Daily, international affairs analyst Omid Khazani said that reaching a temporary agreement between Iran and the United States would be highly optimistic unless the deal were backed by a coalition of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries, with one or all its members guaranteeing its implementation.
IRAN DAILY: Can Tehran be expected to agree under the current circumstances to Qatar’s proposal for a temporary ceasefire and the temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz? What conditions could persuade Tehran to accept such a proposal?
KHAZANI: Considering that US military forces are constantly being reinforced in the region, with refueling tankers and fighter jets being deployed, and that tensions are escalating — at least on paper — while events in southern Iran are unfolding on a daily basis, it would be highly optimistic to assume that Iran could reach a temporary agreement with the United States. From the Iranian side, anyone who wanted to put their signature on such a temporary agreement would be taking an extremely high risk.
But as for the preconditions Iran is seeking, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz is vital because Iran sees it as a security guarantee for itself. It would allow Iran both to generate revenue from the waterway and make up for the losses inflicted by the war, while also maintaining a degree of control over the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s energy artery, as a deterrent lever.
If Iran can get others to accept that it has sovereign rights there, that could serve as a trump card for it. Therefore, as long as the issue of the Strait of Hormuz is not resolved through a temporary, medium-term or long-term agreement, we will not see stability in the region, because no Iranian official can sign such a deal without these conditions being met.
Accordingly, the conditions that the United States would have to put on the table — and that Iran would have to accept — could be far more complicated, unless all the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council member states come in and sign the agreement. For example, Saudi Arabia could guarantee its implementation, or all six regional countries could do so.
The agreement brokered by Pakistan did not last very long, precisely because of the US president’s unique personality and the exceptional circumstances in the region.
Could a 10-day ceasefire pave the way for a sustained reduction in tensions between Iran and the United States, or, given previous experience with the US honoring its commitments, would it merely constitute a temporary pause in the fighting to allow the US to regroup?
A 10-day agreement, or even one lasting a month or two, cannot by itself offer much of a prospect for peace in the region unless Iran has a good opportunity and there is a domestic consensus in Iran to pursue a policy of soft deterrence alongside hard deterrence — meaning both the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz.
That would involve tying Western interests and the interests of major US companies to the oil and gas sectors in the Persian Gulf. Such a process requires more time and a sustainable outlook to materialize.
Therefore, any short-term agreement could be extremely fragile unless it is accompanied by an element of soft deterrence. In other words, tenders would have to be launched immediately and major multinational companies brought into Iran’s energy sector at a rapid pace. At that point, alongside hard deterrence, soft deterrence could also emerge and strengthen the prospects for lasting peace and security in the region.
Otherwise, given that one side of the equation is the Trump administration and the US president himself, Iran cannot rely on a temporary agreement with such a person unless it has the endorsement of the Senate and Congress, which is also highly unlikely.
Therefore, any short-term agreement or short-term peace between Iran and the United States has the potential to be an opportunity to strengthen military capabilities and improve the regional conditions for broader military operations.
On the other hand, if the US midterm elections end with a Republican victory, there would be a possibility that the United States could increase its military presence in the region to more than 500,000 personnel and deploy ground forces there. If the midterm elections end in a Republican defeat — which I personally consider more likely than the alternative — the likelihood of expanding US forces and military engagements in the region would decline.
But in the absence of soft deterrence, and relying solely on hard deterrence, the prospect of sporadic tensions would remain.
What is the necessary precondition for such a process to succeed, and what steps should the two sides take in this direction?
Iran has no choice but to reach an agreement with a coalition, or at least with the US government alongside a regional coalition. You cannot rely on President Trump’s signature. He is someone who could change his mind at any moment.
Therefore, one condition Iran could rely on is for the GCC countries to be signatories to — and at a minimum, guarantors of — such a temporary agreement, rather than the US president alone.
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