US war on infrastructure ...
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If bridges, rail lines, coastal routes, electricity, telecommunications, fuel depots and island support networks in southern Iran are targeted, the issue moves beyond the military sphere and spills over into domestic resilience, everyday life and the capacity to govern. In this context, even traditional boats, fishing vessels, small jetties and vessel-repair workshops could come under fire, because they are not just means of livelihood; in wartime, they are also part of the flexible logistics network supporting the coast and islands.
At the same time, water, electricity, telecommunications towers and control towers in the hot southern climate are not simply urban services; they are part of the capacity to sustain operations. Cutting off fresh water, electricity and communications can disable ports, bases and coastal cities without any ground occupation.
On the other hand, if this pressure disrupts Kharg, Hormuz or Chabahar and consequently drives up oil prices and energy insecurity, the cost for the United States and its allies will also rise rapidly. Therefore, this phase is likely to end when both sides conclude that continuing to strike at each other is generating more instability, economic costs and regional risks than actual gains.
When the United States began attacking Iran’s infrastructure, did it factor in Tehran’s potential retaliation and the possibility of damage to the infrastructure of regional countries?
These risks were most likely part of the US calculations, but Washington appears to have assessed them as “manageable.” The United States seems to be acting on the assumption that, without launching a classic invasion on the scale of Iraq in 2003, it can shift the balance through the operational detachment of the south, the isolation of the islands, disruption in Chabahar and Kharg and, if necessary, the use of special forces and air assault operations to temporarily control sensitive points.
Under this model, the objective is not necessarily to occupy Bandar Abbas or Hormozgan, but to create a situation in which Iran is forced into a costly battle to retain or retake operational control of its coastline and islands.
So, yes, the United States has probably factored in these costs from the outset. But the central issue is that in the Persian Gulf and eastern Iran, the distance between a “manageable cost” and the regional spillover of the crisis is very short.