The MoU lies in ruins
Why Iran should treat it as terminated
By Ali Karimi Magham
Senior policy analyst
The United States has, through a deliberate sequence of military strikes and economic reversals, rendered the June memorandum of understanding inoperative. US kinetic operations against Iranian targets in early July, the revocation of oil sales authorisations, and the re-imposition of sanctions represent not peripheral disagreements but fundamental breaches of the agreement’s central commitments: the immediate cessation of hostilities and the suspension of economic coercion. Under established principles of international law, a material breach of this nature relieves the injured party of any continuing obligation to perform or negotiate further under the instrument. Iran, therefore, has both the legal right and the strategic necessity to treat the MoU as terminated. Returning to the negotiating table while these violations remain unaddressed would neither serve Iranian interests nor constitute rational statecraft.
The MoU was constructed on two non-negotiable foundations. The first required an immediate and permanent end to military operations on all fronts. The second envisaged concrete movement towards economic normalisation, beginning with relief on oil sales and a halt to new sanctions pressure. US actions have directly assaulted both foundations. Strikes on Iranian territory after the agreement was signed reintroduced the use of force that the text explicitly sought to suspend. The simultaneous rollback of economic concessions eliminated the very incentives that were meant to create space for substantive talks. These steps are not implementation frictions; they constitute the reassertion of the coercive instruments the MoU was designed to contain. A party that resorts to force and sanctions while simultaneously demanding Iranian restraint has forfeited the minimal credibility required for any serious negotiation.
From a strategic standpoint, the argument for withdrawal is decisive. Conducting talks while Iranian territory remains under active threat and new sanctions are being applied normalises the use of military and economic pressure as routine negotiating tools. It communicates to Washington that periodic displays of force can reset the diplomatic baseline and extract further Iranian flexibility.
This dynamic directly undermines the deterrence posture Iran has sought to rebuild since 2018. Each round of engagement conducted under the shadow of fresh attacks teaches the adversary that escalation carries low cost and high reward. Iran’s experience with the JCPOA already illustrated the consequences of entering comprehensive agreements with a party that regards its own commitments as provisional and reversible.
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